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PROSECUTING CREDITORS AND 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS: CRACKING 
DOWN ON CREDITORS THAT EXTORT 
VIA DEBT CRIMINALIZATION 
PRACTICES 
CREOLA JOHNSON* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Searching online for the words “consumer,” “arrested,” and “debtor’s 
prison,” reveals numerous news stories about individuals who have been arrested 
over unpaid credit card debt, payday loans, and other consumer debts. For 
instance, Joy Ulhmeyer, while driving home to Richland, Minnesota, was 
arrested during a traffic stop and spent sixteen hours in jail before discovering 
that her arrest stemmed from unpaid credit card debt.1 Christina McHan, a Texas 
resident, was arrested and spent a night in jail after Cash Biz filed a criminal 
complaint against her for defaulting on a $200 payday loan.2 Similarly, Antonio 
Walker was arrested during a traffic stop in Norfolk, Virginia.3 In a criminal 
complaint filed against him, Colortyme claimed that Mr. Walker had failed to 
return a dinette set after defaulting on his rent-to-own (RTO) payments.4 Even 
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1.  See Chris Serres & Glenn Howatt, In Jail for Being in Debt, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 17, 2011, 4:40
PM), http://www.startribune.com/in-jail-for-being-in-debt/95692619 [https://perma.cc/7GK5-BFJV] 
(reporting that “after 16 hours in limbo, jail officials fingerprinted Uhlmeyer and explained her offense—
missing a court hearing over an unpaid debt” and quoting her as saying “[t]hey have no right to do this 
to me . . . [n]ot for a stupid credit card”).  
2.  See, e.g., Forrest Wilder, Fast Cash: How Taking Out a Payday Loan Could Land You in Jail,
TEX. OBSERVER (July 16, 2013, 11:49 AM), https://www.texasobserver.org/cash-fast-how-taking-out-a-
payday-loan-could-land-you-in-jail/ [https://perma.cc/GTP9-M2LZ]. 
3.  Louis Hansen, Criminal Prosecutions Soar in Rent-To-Own Sector, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Apr. 11,
2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/04/criminal-prosecutions-soar-renttoown-sector [https://perma.cc/ 
QVZ6-V5L3]. Colortyme is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Rent-A-Center, the largest RTO company 
in the United States. Michael H. Anderson, An Economic Perspective on Subprime Lending, 89 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 53, 56 (2013). 
4.  Anderson, supra note 3, at 56.
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though the criminal charges were later dropped, his boss, the driver during that 
fateful traffic stop, fired Mr. Walker.5 
This article describes the pervasive problem of companies and lenders 
resorting to practices that criminalize consumers who default on payments of civil 
debts. Such practices criminalize consumers by inducing terror in consumers of 
being arrested for or charged with a crime related to their unpaid debts. Though 
creditors contend they are merely engaged in debt collection, this article asserts 
that such practices amount to extortion when they incite fear in consumers to get 
them to pay past-due debts or relinquish ownership of assets.6 
This article describes three types of criminalization practices: (1) threatening 
to pursue prosecution of consumers for committing a crime; (2) filing police 
reports to initiate criminal charges against consumers; and (3) misusing civil 
contempt to obtain arrest warrants against consumers. Part II provides examples 
of creditors that criminalize consumers by terrorizing them with threats that 
conjure up images of their immediate arrest for theft-related crimes. For 
example, in an enforcement action filed against a subprime auto lender and a car 
title lender,7 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) alleged that 
these lenders made threats to have consumers immediately arrested by using Skip 
Tracy, a telephone spoofing technology that caused caller identification devices 
to make it appear that the threatening calls were coming from various 
investigation departments.8 Because creditors are using such threats to coerce 
consumers into paying out of fear of being arrested, these threats constitute 
   
 
 5.  Hansen, supra note 3.  
 6.  Every state has a statute making certain conduct constitute the crime of extortion or coercion. 
Richard W. Smith, Note, Interpreting the Constitution From Inside the Jury Box: Affecting Interstate 
Commerce as an Element of the Crime, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 615, 625 n.62 (1998). For example, in 
California, “[t]here are four types of threats that would induce fear for purposes of the extortion statute: 
(1) a threat of an unlawful injury to the person or property of the victim or to a third person; (2) a threat 
to accuse the victim or any relative or family member of any crime; (3) a threat to expose or to impute to 
the victim any deformity, disgrace, or crime; or (4) a threat to expose any secret affecting the victim or 
his or her family.” RUTTER GROUP-CAL. CRIM. L. § 8:83 (2016–2017 ed.). 
 7.  A car title loan is secured by the consumer’s paid-off vehicle, and it typically carries a triple-digit 
interest rate and requires a single balloon payment due usually in 30 days or less. See Creola Johnson, 
Creditors’ Use of Consumer Debt Criminalization Practices and Their Financial Abuse of Women, 34 
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 5, 47–49 (2016) (discussing criminalization tactics used against a single mother 
who was forced to turn over possession of her car to the lender’s repossession agent and arguing that 
such tactics were not only unlawful but constituted abuse).  
 8.  See Westlake Services, LLC & Wilshire Consumer Credit, LLC 2015-CFPB-0026 (2015) 
[hereinafter Westlake Consent Order] (consent order) (“‘Skip Tracy’ means a web-based, multimedia, 
third-party paid service that allows users to place outgoing calls and choose (a) the phone number from 
which the calls will appear to have originated; and (b) particular text that may appear on call recipients’ 
phones as Caller ID. If a call recipient returns a call to one of these phone numbers, Skip Tracy shows 
the user the Caller ID text associated with the original outgoing call”). The lenders settled the case by 
agreeing to pay $48.3 million, of which $44.1 million will be paid as restitution and loan reductions to 
affected consumers. See CFPB Hits Auto Lender with $48.3M in Fines, Restitution, AM. BANKER (Oct. 
2, 2015, 4:19 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-hits-auto-lender-with-483m-in-fines-
restitution [https://perma.cc/MD5F-NBME].  
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extortion. Therefore, creditors should be criminally prosecuted for making 
them.9 
 Part II transitions from describing creditors that only make threats to have 
consumers arrested to describing creditors that employ the second form of 
criminalization—filing police reports or complaints to get law enforcement to 
charge consumers with crimes. Ms. McHan and Mr. Walker were victims of this 
form of consumer debt criminalization.10 Although a creditor may claim it has the 
right to file criminal charges, such a filing constitutes extortion when it accuses 
the consumer of a crime in order to induce the consumer to either pay the debt 
or relinquish ownership of assets. 
Part III of this article describes how some creditors, instead of filing police 
reports against consumers directly, misuse the civil contempt process as a back 
door into the criminal justice system to have consumers arrested for failing to pay 
civil debts. Chase Bank sued Ms. Uhlmeyer for defaulting on her credit card 
payments to the company. After obtaining a default judgment against her, Chase 
filed documents that required Ms. Uhlemeyer to appear for an oral hearing.11 Ms. 
Uhlemeyer’s failure to appear was later used to obtain a civil contempt order, 
which resulted in Ms. Uhlemeyer’s arrest.12 Part III describes the circumstances 
under which a creditor’s request for an oral examination constitutes a pretext for 
their ultimate goal of getting civil contempt orders and arrest warrants issued 
against consumers. Such misuse of the civil contempt process is a criminalization 
practice that constitutes extortion because the consumer is coerced into paying 
to avoid arrest or to get out of jail. 
Part IV then argues for the prosecution of creditors for extortion to deter 
creditors from using criminalization practices to evade state constitutions that 
prohibit the incarceration of individuals for unpaid civil debts. If left 
unprosecuted, creditors will not only make a mockery of state constitutions, they 
will also continue violating various consumer protection statutes that prohibit 
threats of arrests against consumers for failure to pay civil debts. Because the 
creditors described in this article have built their business models on issuing 
extremely high-cost credit to cash-strapped consumers, their customers are, at 
the outset, vulnerable to extortive threats. This vulnerability makes it more likely 
that they will heed the creditors’ demands to pay—by borrowing from other 
lenders, using protected income sources, or begging friends and relatives to pay 
their debts. As a result, creditors should be prosecuted to protect these 
vulnerable consumers from going further into debt and to protect indebted 
consumers’ dependents and other loved ones. 
 
 9.  In addition to being prosecuted on the basis that they threaten to accuse consumers of crime, 
some creditors should be prosecuted on the grounds that they have subjected consumers to humiliation 
and exposed their indebtedness to others by contacting their friends and relatives and by showing up at 
their places of employment. See, e.g., Westlake Consent Order, supra note 8. 
 10.  See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 11.  Serres & Howatt, supra note 1. 
 12.  Id. 
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Beyond prosecution, part V proposes solutions that include completely 
banning payday lenders from filing criminal complaints, police reports, or taking 
other action that causes a consumer to be accused of, or charged with, a crime 
related to a payday loan debt. To address criminalization tactics employed by 
RTO companies, state legislatures should amend any theft statutes related to 
rental property to exclude consumers who obtained RTO property for personal, 
family, or household use. To deter the misuse of civil contempt, states should 
amend their civil procedure rules to prohibit a creditor from requesting an oral 
examination in the absence of documented proof that the consumer is an above-
median-income debtor. Otherwise, creditors will continue to use oral 
examination requests as a pretext to achieving their real goal—a warrant for the 
consumer’s arrest. 
Proposed solutions also include allowing consumers to collect both treble and 
punitive damages from creditors that have engaged in consumer criminalization 
tactics. The occasional payment of a civil fine by some creditors appears to be 
insufficient to deter them from employing consumer debt criminalization tactics. 
When the cost of doing wrong outweighs the benefits gained from doing right, 
then creditors will be deterred from using consumer criminalization tactics. 
Lawmakers should, at a minimum, make unenforceable the creditors’ arbitration 
clauses and class action waiver provisions. Otherwise, creditors will continue to 
exploit the criminal justice system to terrorize consumers via threats of arrest 
while simultaneously engaging in duplicitous tactics to lock those same 
consumers out of the civil court system. 
II 
CRIMINALIZATION VIA LENDERS’ THREATS OF IMMINENT INCARCERATION 
AND FILING OF CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS 
The term “consumer debt criminalization” explains two common 
criminalization tactics: creditors’ threating consumers with imminent arrest and 
creditors’ filing criminal complaints that lead to consumers being formally 
accused of crimes and sometimes arrested.13 This part provides new examples of 
these criminalization tactics and asserts that they constitute extortion. When 
criminalization practices only take the form of threats to have the consumer 
arrested, such threats may seem trivial. However, nothing can be further from 
the truth. Numerous federal and state enforcement actions demonstrate that 
consumers regularly succumb to these threats by paying phantom debts, that is, 
debts not actually owed, or by paying amounts far in excess of what is owed.14 
 
 13.  I first used the term “consumer debt criminalization practices” in a law review article to describe 
the pervasive use of such practices against women and their disparate impact on them. See Johnson, supra 
note 7, at 47–50. 
 14.  See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC and Federal, State and Local Law 
Enforcement Partners Announce Nationwide Crackdown against Abusive Debt Collectors (Nov. 4, 
2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/11/ftc-federal-state-local-law-enforcement-
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The lenders’ threats to have consumers arrested and charged with a crime are 
made to intimidate consumers into complying with the lenders’ demands by 
making payments or turning over personal property like cars or furniture.15 
When criminalization practices take the form of a lender actually filing a 
police report or obtaining a warrant for the consumer’s arrest, such actions are 
taken by the lender to coerce consumers into immediately complying with the 
lender’s demands.16 A consumer who may not have been moved by a verbal 
threat will then be confronted with the real possibility of going to jail because of 
the lender’s actions. Under those circumstances, consumers try, and often find a 
way, to pay to avoid going to or to get out of jail. 
These criminalization practices constitute extortion because the creditors’ 
threats and conduct engender fear in consumers that results in consumers losing 
control of their bank accounts, relinquishing ownership of their vehicles, losing 
possession of their rent-to-own merchandise, and, sometimes, losing their 
freedom (at least temporarily).17 
 
partners-announce [https://perma.cc/2D4F-LKBB] (announcing the results of Operation Collection 
Protection, a nationwide initiative by the FTC, in collaboration with 71 enforcement partners, which as 
of that date, had led to the filing of 115 cases and the shutting down of several companies, including 
companies that used threats to coerce consumers into making payments on phantom payday loan debts 
(in other words, debts not owed) or making payments to companies lacking the authority to collect such 
debts). See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Action: Debt Collector Banned from Collection 
Business (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/08/ftc-action-debt-
collector-banned-collection-business [https://perma.cc/73R7-67JN] (summarizing the settlement of a case 
filed by the FTC and New York’s Attorney General against four debt collection companies “charg[ing] 
them with collecting on fake payday loans they knew consumers did not really owe, and using deceptive 
and abusive tactics to get them to pay, including false threats of lawsuits and arrest”); Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Florida Residents Sentenced for Defrauding and Threatening Spanish-Speaking 
Consumers (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-residents-sentenced-defrauding-and-
threatening-spanish-speaking-consumers [https://perma.cc/PYR3-EK4H] (summarizing the conviction 
of two individuals operating a scam that defrauded Spanish-speaking consumers using numerous threats, 
including threats of arrest and deportation); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Takes Action to 
Stop Phantom Debt Scam that Targeted Spanish-Speaking Consumers Nationwide (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/ftc-takes-action-stop-phantom-debt-scam-target 
ed-spanish-speaking [https://perma.cc/2VQH-6L6J] (summarizing a temporary restraining order 
imposed on debt collectors targeting Spanish-speaking persons who collected over $2 million of non-
existent debt, or “phantom debt,” by continually calling and harassing the victims and sometimes abusing 
them with profane language). See also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 
PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumer 
finance.gov/f/documents/201703_cfpb_Fair-Debt-Collection-Practices-Act-Annual-Report.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/LA2M-AG4S] (summarizing numerous cases filed in 2016 separately by the CFPB and the FTC 
against companies and individuals accused of violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, stating 
that debt collection companies and their attempts to collect phantom debts comprise the majority of 
complaints submitted by consumers to the CFPB’s Consumer Response program, and announcing that 
in cases filed by the CFPB consumers received $39 million in restitution).  
 15.  See, e.g., infra notes 20–40 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See, e.g., infra notes 70–81 and accompanying text. 
 17.  See infra notes 42–69 and accompanying text (analyzing extortion law and asserting that 
creditors commit criminal extortion when they make threats to have consumers arrested for unpaid civil 
debts or threats to expose their debts to others); infra notes 82–112 and accompanying text (explaining 
how creditors commit extortion when they file police reports and take similar actions to have consumers 
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A. Creditors Threats Of Arrest Often Successfully Coerce Consumers Into 
Paying Or Turning Over Assets 
Some lenders only make threats to have a consumer arrested, and they do so 
by conjuring in the consumer’s mind illusions of an imminent arrest. Sometimes 
the threat is based on an actual criminal statute that seems to match the 
consumer’s conduct.18 Other times, creditors accuse consumers of crimes that do 
not apply to the consumers’ conduct, relying on opaque criminal statutes that 
consumers do not understand.19  Virginia Robinson, a resident of West Virginia, 
provides a glaring example of a consumer who fell prey to criminal accusations 
after defaulting on a car title loan from Fast Auto Loans, Inc. (FAL).20 
Under a car title loan, a vehicle that the consumer owns outright is used as 
collateral to secure a personal loan equal to only a fraction of vehicle’s value.21 
To get the loan, the consumer generally must bring the vehicle to the lender and 
surrender a clean certificate of title, which is proof that the consumer owns the 
vehicle and no other lender has a lien or claim against the vehicle.22 Car title loans 
are legal in many states, even though they carry triple-digit interest rates and 
could lead to the loss of a consumer’s vehicle—often the only reliable 
  
  
 
arrested for failing to pay debts or to relinquish possession of their assets). 
 18.  See Johnson, supra note 7, at 20–28 (describing how companies accuse consumers of committing 
crimes, such as passing a bad check to get a payday loan, and then successfully create the illusion of 
imminent incarceration to coerce consumers into paying phantom payday loan debts or paying amounts 
far greater than owed). 
 19.  See, e.g., infra notes 28–37 and accompanying text (explaining how a car title lender used an 
opaquely worded criminal statute to accuse Virginia Robinson of a crime for failing to immediately allow 
the lender to repossess her vehicle). 
 20.  Trial Pleading at 60, West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Fast Auto Loans Inc., No. 3:12-cv-64, 2012 
WL 4864760 (N.D.W. Va. 2012) [hereinafter WV’s Complaint] (Exh. J. - Affidavit of Virginia Robinson). 
 21.  AMANDA QUESTER & JEAN ANN FOX, CAR TITLE LENDING: DRIVING BORROWERS TO 
FINANCIAL RUIN 4 (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-
publication/rr008-Car_Title_Lending-0405.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SPG-59ZQ] (stating that car title loans 
are sometimes referred to as auto title loans, car title pawns, title pledge loans, or other similar names, 
and are marketed to cash-strapped, credit-challenged consumers).  
 22.  See, e.g., In re Schwalb, 347 B.R. 726 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (stating that the debtor provided 
two clean certificates of title to obtain loans secured by two vehicles, holding that the car title lender 
violated several provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and imposing on the lender 
minimum statutory damages of nearly $26,000 for its violations) (applying Nevada law). See generally Jim 
Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 
542 (2012) (describing the steps to obtain a car title loan and stating that borrowers usually have to 
produce clear title). 
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transportation.23 West Virginia, however, is one of a few states that judicially 
banned car title loans.24 
Because of West Virginia’s ban, Ms. Robinson had to cross the border to 
Virginia to obtain a $1,000 loan secured by her 1999 Jeep Cherokee.25 Ms. 
Robinson stated in an affidavit that after she defaulted on her loan payments, 
FAL’s employees repeatedly called her daughter, friends, and co-workers and 
left messages that FAL would take her Jeep if she failed to pay the car title loan.26 
On the occasions when Ms. Robinson was able to speak by telephone with a FAL 
employee, the employee would threaten to send a repossession agent, known as 
a “repo man,” along with a sheriff’s deputy to pick up the Jeep.27 
FAL eventually sent a repo man to Ms. Robinson’s home. Because she was 
not home, the repo man left a written document with her daughter captioned 
“CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE.”28 The document contained several bold faced, 
all capitalized paragraphs, one of which ended with the following crime she 
supposedly committed: “A 3RD DEGREE FELONY CONVERSION OF 
COLLATERALIZED PROPERTY.”29 
The document given to Ms. Robinson also cited to and quoted from a Virginia 
statute describing larceny as the fraudulent conversion or removal of property 
subject to a lien.30 A person is guilty of larceny under this statute if, among other 
things, he or she conceals the location of property that is subject to a lien.31 
Another provision of the Virginia code makes it a larceny to “fraudulently sell, 
pledge, pawn or remove such property from the premises where it has been 
agreed that it shall remain, and refuse to disclose the location thereof.”32 This 
 
 23.  See Delvin Davis, Press Release, Consumers Lose $8 Billion In Fees Each Year With Payday 
And Car-title Loans, Center for Responsible Lending (May 17, 2016), http://www.responsible 
lending.org/media/consumers-lose-8-billion-fees-each-year-payday-and-car-title-loans [https://perma.cc/ 
56VK-3T72] (stating that car title lending is legal in 23 states).  See, e.g., Gregoria v. Total Asset 
Recovery, Inc., No. 12-4315, 2015 WL 115501 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2015) (holding that a repossession agent 
for a car title lender could be found liable under RICO for repossessing a car after the consumer’s default 
on a loan with a 150% interest rate, which was usurious under Pennsylvania law). 
 24. Car title lending is illegal in West Virginia by judicial decision. See State ex rel. McGraw v. Pawn 
America, 518 S.E.2d 859, 861 (W. Va. 1998). 
 25.  WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 1. 
 26.  Id. at 1–2. 
 27.  Id. at 2. 
 28.  Id. at 3 (identifying the repo man as an employee from K.A.R. Towing, a repo company located 
in Harrisburg, Virginia) (emphasis in certificate). 
 29.  Id. (emphasis in certificate). 
 30.  Id. at 3.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  VA CODE ANN. § 18.2-115. The statute provides in relevant part:  
[A]ny person is in possession of any personal property, including motor vehicles or farm 
products, in any capacity, the title or ownership of which he has agreed in writing shall be or 
remain in another, or on which he has given a lien, and such person so in possession shall 
fraudulently sell, pledge, pawn or remove such property from the premises where it has been 
agreed that it shall remain, and refuse to disclose the location thereof, or otherwise dispose of 
the property or fraudulently remove the same from the Commonwealth [of Virginia], without 
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statute became law in 1975, decades before the high-cost lenders like FAL began 
issuing car title loans.33 No evidence on the record shows that Ms. Robinson 
intended to sell, destroy, or dispose of her own car. Furthermore, she must have 
had FAL’s permission, at least implicitly, to move her vehicle outside Virginia 
because FAL knew she lived and worked in West Virginia, a state in which car 
title lending is not legal.34 Ms. Robinson did not sell or get rid of her car; she 
simply could not afford the payments on the car title loan. Therefore, she could 
not have been guilty of larceny. However, if Ms. Robinson and other borrowers 
threatened with arrest read only the Certificate of Service or looked online for 
the cited larceny statute, they could have erroneously concluded that they had 
committed a crime and could only avoid prosecution by turning over their 
vehicles to FAL or by paying the entire debt owed. 
Research has not uncovered any cases or news reports indicating that a 
consumer who has defaulted on a car title loan can be prosecuted under this 
Virginia criminal statute. Therefore, FAL had no basis to believe such a 
prosecution was possible, and it never intended to seek the prosecution of Ms. 
Robinson. This conclusion is supported by a lawsuit filed by Darrell McGraw, 
former Attorney General for West Virginia, against FAL, its parent company, 
and their officers (hereinafter the “FAL defendants”).35 According to the lawsuit, 
the FAL defendants repeatedly violated the state’s consumer protection law by, 
among other things, threatening to accuse consumers of crimes and have them 
arrested.36 The motive for such threats was to coerce consumers into making 
payments or turning over their vehicles.37  By conjuring up this larceny crime and 
by repeatedly harassing the customers who had defaulted, FAL was able to do 
exactly what it wanted—take cars belonging to Ms. Robinson38 and others and 
 
the written consent of the owner or lienor or the person in whom the title is, or, if such writing 
be a deed of trust, without the written consent of the trustee or beneficiary in such deed of trust, 
he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny thereof.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, at ¶¶16–17 (alleging that the majority of West Virginia 
residents who obtained a car title loan from the FAL defendants had to cross the state border into 
Virginia and identifying 512 certificate of titles with notations of liens filed by the FAL defendants in the 
state of West Virginia, not Virginia). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  See Second Amended Complaint, State v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc., 2013 WL 8539987 (W. Va. Cir. 
Ct.) (No. 12C231) [hereinafter WV’s Second Amended Complaint]. 
 37.  See id. at ¶¶ 64–65 (alleging that the defendants also “wrongfully enlist[ed] uniformed police 
officers to carry out vehicle seizures without a court order”). 
 38.  WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 1. After the repo man left the Certificate of Service, 
another repo man, acting on FAL’s behalf, appeared at Ms. Robinson’s place of employment to try to 
get her to turn over her vehicle. Id. at 2. Thereafter, Ms. Robinson stated that she continued to get 
telephone calls at least every other day from FAL’s employees. Id. She finally decided to surrender the 
vehicle to FAL, which subsequently sold it. Id. Although she made several payments on the $1,000 loan, 
Ms. Robinson stated that FAL never gave her an accounting of the sale proceeds and never gave her 
surplus funds in excess of the debt owed, as required under secured transactions law. Id. See also West 
Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (N.D.W. Va. 2013) 
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sell them, allegedly in violation of the state’s consumer protection law.39 The 
West Virginia Attorney General’s investigation revealed that the FAL 
defendants had repossessed at least 218 vehicles owned by West Virginia 
residents.40 
Given the flagrant practices of the FAL defendants and other lenders, several 
states have sued some of them for numerous violations, including making 
unlawful threats against consumers.41 As explained in part II.B, law enforcement 
and prosecutors need to recognize that these same threats amount to extortion 
and lenders should be prosecuted for making them. 
 
(summarizing West Virginia’s allegations, including an allegation that FAL failed to comply with state 
law by failing to provide written notices accounting for the sale of repossessed vehicles and by failing to 
refund surplus proceeds when consumers were entitled to receive them). 
 39.  See WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at ¶¶ 64–65 (alleging that the FAL 
defendants made direct threats to consumers to have them prosecuted and used police officers to help 
coerce consumers into relinquishing ownership of their vehicles).   See also Fast Auto Loans, 918 F. Supp. 
2d at 563–65 (granting West Virginia’s motion to remand its lawsuit against the FAL defendants back to 
state court). 
 40.  See Chris Dickerson, AG’s Office Reaches $1.2M Settlement in Auto Title Lender Case, W. VA. 
RECORD (Apr. 9, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20170426132902/http://wvrecord.com/stories/ 
510586931-ag-s-office-reaches-1-2m-settlement-in-auto-title-lender-case (Under the settlement, the 
companies agreed to close all accounts, cancel all debt owed to them by West Virginia consumers 
(estimated at $816,000), return any unsold vehicles seized from state residents, and remove any liens on 
those vehicles). The FAL defendants eventually settled the case filed against them by agreeing to pay 
$1.2 million but not admitting to any wrongdoing. Id. Whatever compensation Ms. Robinson and others 
were able to obtain from the settlement; it would not be enough to restore the loss of valuable vehicles 
that the lenders re-sold to others. 
 41.  See, e.g., id. In addition to the state of West Virginia, other state and federal authorities have 
filed enforcement actions against RTO companies, payday lenders, and car title lenders for violating 
applicable laws by, among other things, engaging in unlawful debt collection practices. See, e.g., Appendix 
D, Rent-A-Center West, Inc v. Washington, No. 08-2-32502-4 SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2010) (In 
defense of a 2009 lawsuit filed by Rent-A-Center against the State of Washington and its then Attorney 
General James Sugarman, the state obtained written sworn statements from customers who described 
under penalty of perjury practices by Rent-A-Center’s employees that amount to unlawful and abusive 
collection tactics, including making threats to have customers arrested); Consent Decree, Rent-A-Center 
West, Inc. v. Washington, No. 08-2-32502-4 SEA, 2010 WL 2572150  (Wash. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2010) 
(lacking an admission of wrongdoing, Rent-A-Center entered into a consent decree with Washington 
and agreed to pay a fine); Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against ACE 
Case Express for Pushing Payday Borrowers Into a Cycle of Debt (July 10, 2014), http://www. 
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-pushing-payd 
ay-borrowers-into-cycle-of-debt [https://perma.cc/HA6K-E7LX] (In a lawsuit filed by the CFPB against 
ACE Cash Express, the second largest payday lender, the CFPB alleged that ACE’s own in-house 
employees as well as ACE’s third-party debt collectors threatened consumers with criminal prosecution 
and uncovered an ACE training manual with a graphic image allegedly demonstrating how ACE 
employees were expected to create a “sense of urgency” in order to get consumers to pay); Press Release, 
Mich. Att’y Gen. Bill Schuette, Schuette Secures Victory Against Auto Title Loan Company Liquidation, 
LLC to Protect Michigan Residents from Illegal Title Loans (June 8, 2016), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170424204834 /http://www.michigan.gov/ag/0,4534,7-164-46849-386461--,0 
0.html (announcing that Michigan’s attorney general obtained a default judgment and permanent 
injunction against Liquidation, LLC, along with several related defendants, for numerous violations, 
including making illegal car title loans and engaging in unlawful collection practices, such as illegally 
repossessing consumers’ vehicles and stealing the equity after selling the vehicles). 
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B. Creditors’ Threats Constitute Extortion Because They Accuse The 
Consumer Of Committing Crimes And They Expose The Consumer’s 
Indebtedness 
Extortion is the making of a threat to incite fear in another person to induce 
that person to hand over money or other property.42 Each state’s statute identifies 
several types of threats that form the basis for an extortion or coercion 
prosecution.43 Among the list of unlawful threats is threatening to accuse a person 
of committing a crime to induce fear in that person in order to extract money or 
other property.44 
A close analysis of the investigation conducted by West Virginia’s Attorney 
General against the FAL defendants provide examples of extortion and how they 
could have prosecuted them for using threats to coerce Ms. Robinson and others 
into relinquishing ownership of their vehicles. First, consider the following 
language in the Certificate of Service given to Ms. Robinson: 
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THIS NOTICE IS UNLAWFUL UNDER THE 
PROVISION OF VIRGINIA CODE (SECTION 18 PARAGRAPH 2, 
SUBPARAGRAPH 115/118) IF UNDER A LEIN, AND IS A 3RD DEGREE 
FELONY CONVERSION OF COLLATERIALIZED PROPERTY. 
SHOULD YOU FAIL TO CONTACT K.A.R. TOWING IMMEDIATELY AT (540) 
564-0131, YOUR INACTION WILL GIVE LITTLE CHOICE AND MAY RESULT 
IN A COMPLAINT BEING FILED WITH YOURLOCAL MAGISTRATE. THIS 
MAY RESULT IN A FELONY WARRANT BEING ISSUED FOR YOUR 
ARREST.45 
The second page of the document begins with the following question: “Is it 
against the law to hide your car from being repossessed?”46 It provided the 
following short answer: “In Virginia = yes.”  
 Under Virginia and West Virginia law,47 the words contained in the 
Certificate of Service constitute extortion because they threaten to accuse Ms. 
Robinson of a crime. Examine the above words in light of a relevant case in which 
the court construed the defendant’s writing as an implied threat to accuse 
 
 42.  See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL Law § 20.4 (2d. ed. 2003 & 2016 Update).  
 43.  Id.; RUTTER GROUP-CAL. CRIM. L., supra note 6, at § 8:83 (describing four unlawful threats 
under California law). 
 44.  See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 42. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL L. § 135.60(4) (2008) (“A person is guilty of 
coercion in the second degree when he or she compels or induces . . . by means of instilling in him or her 
a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will . . . [a]ccuse some person of a 
crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him or her”). 
 45.  WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 3 (emphasis in certificate).  
 46.  Id. at 3–4.  
 47.  In Virginia, “[a]ny person who (i) threatens injury to the character, person, or property of 
another person, (ii) accuses him of any offense, . . . and thereby extorts money, property, or pecuniary 
benefit or any note, bond, or other evidence of debt from him or any other person, is guilty of a Class 5 
felony.” VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (2016). In West Virginia, “[i]f any person threaten injury to the 
character, person or property of another person, or to the character, person or property of his wife or 
child, or to accuse him or them of any offense, and thereby extort money, pecuniary benefit, or any bond, 
note or other evidence of debt, he shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in 
the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years.” W. VA. CODE § 61-2-13 (2016). 
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someone of a crime, resulting in an extortion conviction. In People v. Umana,48 
co-defendants Jessica Langshaw and Raul Umana devised a scheme whereby 
Langshaw, after finding men in an internet chat room and meeting them in 
person, would have sex with them and then later accuse them of rape.49 Both 
defendants were convicted of several counts of attempted extortion.50 On appeal, 
Langshaw challenged her convictions involving one victim, Jared P., a man that 
Langshaw met when she was only seventeen years old. 51 Langshaw argued that 
her conviction involving him should be overturned because he had committed a 
crime (statutory rape) given that he knew that she was under-age when the two 
had sex.52 She argued that her letter to him was an attempt to settle a potential 
civil claim against him, not to accuse him of a crime.53 The appellate court focused 
on the following relevant language in her letter to Jared: 
I would like to settle this matter in confidence, but I’m prepared to take further action 
if you wish to dispute my claim. As you know, I’ve notified the Sacramento Police 
Department and State District Attorney. I have also made arrangements with an 
attorney to bring civil charges against you if you refuse to meet the above demands.54 
The court noted that Langshaw stated that she was “prepared to take further 
action” but did not specify what action, and made reference to bringing “civil 
charges.”55 According to the court, those words and the letter as a whole 
contained an implied threat to continue accusing him of a crime and seeking 
prosecution if he did not meet her demands.56  
The court further stated this inference was supported by her actions.57 She 
had already spoken to the district attorney about bringing charges against the 
victim and was still in contact with the police at the time she wrote the letter.58 
Thus, Langshaw made an implicit threat to continuing accusing him of a crime.59  
The case for an extortion conviction against the FAL defendants would be 
even stronger than the case against Langshaw. The Certificate of Service 
constitutes an explicit threat given that it never uses “settle,” “settlement,” or 
similar words. Additionally, it cites to and quotes the entire larceny statute it 
accuses Ms. Robinson of violating. By using the caption “Certificate of Service,” 
the writing also creates the impression that some type of legal action against Ms. 
Robinson may have already begun. Moreover, it uses the words “warrant” and 
 
 48.  People v. Umana, 138 Cal. App. 4th 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 49.  Id. at 628–29. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 640–42. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 638. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 640 (“Parties guilty of the offense here alleged seldom possess the hardihood to speak out 
boldly and plainly, but deal in mysterious and ambiguous phrases.”). 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id.  
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“arrest.”60 Therefore, a jury could easily conclude that the FAL defendants 
committed extortion by explicitly threatening to accuse Ms. Robinson of 
committing a crime.61 
In addition to this written communication, the conduct of the defendants and 
their repo agents threatened to injure, and did in fact injure, Ms. Robinson’s 
character. In most states, threatening to expose someone else’s secrets to subject 
them to humiliation or harm their character to extract property constitutes an 
unlawful threat supporting an extortion conviction. A Virginia case, Stein v. 
Commonwealth, provides an illustration.62 There, the defendant felt that his wife 
had been wrongfully terminated and, as a result, sent letters to the supervisor 
threatening to expose the fact that she had previously been involved in a 
sadomasochistic sexual relationship.63 Because the defendant’s written 
communications included words such as “settlement” and “terms,” he argued 
that his actions were mere attempts to reach a settlement so that his wife could 
receive an apology and have her employment records protected.64 The Stein court 
disagreed, reasoning that no settlement—in the sense of each party giving up 
something to resolve an employment dispute—had been proposed. Instead, the 
defendant only proposed to abstain from exposing the supervisor’s previous 
sadomasochistic relationship.65 His words conveyed a threat to injure the 
supervisor’s character and, as a result, were sufficient to sustain his extortion 
conviction. 
Like the defendant in Stein, the FAL defendants threatened to expose Ms. 
Robinson’s indebtedness to others and followed through on those threats when 
they contacted her friends, relatives, and co-workers.66 According to Ms. 
Robinson, the FAL defendants not only told others about Ms. Robinson’s loan 
default but also about their intention to repossess her vehicle.67 Moreover, one of 
FAL’s repo men actually came to Ms. Robinson’s place of employment, asked 
her co-worker to identify Ms. Robinson, and discussed with the co-worker the 
 
 60.  See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 3 (It plainly states: “THIS MAY RESULT IN A 
FELONY WARRANT BEING ISSUED FOR YOUR ARREST.”) (emphasis in original).  
 61.  The testimony of Ms. Robinson and other consumers who borrowed from FAL would show the 
company engaged in a pattern of making threats. See WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, 
at ¶ 62 (The FAL defendants “shamed or coerced consumers to make payments and to relinquish 
possession of vehicles by accusing them of fraud, crimes and other conduct that, if true, would tend to 
disgrace them or subject them to ridicule or contempt of society, in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-
124(b) and W. Va. Code § 46A-6-104.”). 
 62.  Stein v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1991). 
 63.  Id. (Prior to the wife’s termination, the wife and the supervisor had been friends and the 
supervisor had revealed her involvement in a previous sadomasochistic relationship.).  
 64.  Id. at 242. 
 65.  Id. at 241 (stating that extortion is using “wrongful methods” or acting in “an unlawful manner: 
in order “to compel payments by means of threats of injury to person, property, or reputation”) (quoting 
Extort, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
 66.  See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. J. at 2–3. 
 67.  Id. at 1–2. 
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location of Ms. Robinson’s vehicle.68 All of this was done to injure Ms. 
Robinson’s character by exposing her financial troubles to others for the purpose 
of getting her to turn over the vehicle. According to the West Virginia Attorney 
General’s lawsuit and the sworn declarations submitted by consumers, the FAL 
defendants violated state law by regularly engaging in a pattern of exposing 
consumers’ indebtedness to others.69 This amounts to extortion. 
C. Some Creditors Move From Making Threats To Actually Filing Police 
Reports To Have Consumers Arrested 
Though the FAL defendants only made threats, some creditors go a step 
further and actually file criminal complaints or police reports to extort money or 
property from consumers. Janellen Edwards’ experience is instructive because it 
demonstrates that even when a creditor knows that a consumer has not 
committed a crime, it nevertheless has the ability to initiate an arrest in order to 
intimidate the consumer into paying or turning over property.70 
Ms. Edwards signed an RTO contract to buy three pieces of furniture from 
TRS Home Furnishings (TRS) and, thereafter, made a few payments.71 Due to a 
family crisis, she was unable to pay under the agreed schedule.72 She asked for 
and received from TRS a revised payment schedule.73 After Ms. Edwards made 
the first payment under the new schedule, TRS employees demanded full 
payment of the entire outstanding balance.74 TRS’s intimidating behavior 
included making daily calls demanding that Ms. Edwards pay, leaving voicemail 
messages threatening to show up at her house to repossess the furniture, exposing 
 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at ¶ 59 (“The Defendants routinely, 
systematically, and repeatedly contact consumer’s employers, co-workers, references, family members, 
friends, and other third parties to leave messages for the consumer to contact them when, in fact, the 
Defendants have current location information for the consumers and when the true purpose of the call 
is to annoy, abuse, harass, embarrass or humiliate the consumer, and to disclose the fact that the 
consumer owes a delinquent debt directly or indirectly, in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-126(b) and 
W. Va. Code § 46A-6-104.”). 
 70.  Because Ms. Edwards endured several weeks of escalating threats from the RTO company until 
she was eventually arrested, her story is very lengthy. Rather than provide upfront the entire narrative 
of her ordeal, the discussion will begin with a brief summary and then highlight the parts of Ms. Edwards’ 
ordeal that are relevant to each count of extortion the RTO company could have been charged with 
committing. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at ¶ 1, 
Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 5497167 (Or. Cir. July 19, 2010). 
 71.  Amended Complaint at ¶ 2, Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 
5497172 (Or. Cir. Feb. 9, 2010) (stating that TRS was an assumed business name for The Rental Store, 
Inc.). Ms. Edwards purchased furniture from TRS in hopes of improving her credit. See Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at ¶ 2 (stating that a 
“financial counselor suggested that she [Edwards] make a large purchase on credit, which would in turn 
improve the rest of her credit”). 
 72.  See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at ¶ 5 (Ms. 
Edwards’ father was diagnosed with cancer.). 
 73.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
 74.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
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her indebtedness to relatives and friends, and appearing more than once at her 
home and job to force her to turn over the furniture.75 
When none of these threats achieved the desired results, a TRS employee 
filed a complaint with the local police department.76 Thereafter, two police 
officers arrived at Ms. Edwards’ workplace to issue a criminal citation and inform 
her of the required court appearance.77 She was later arrested. According to Ms. 
Edwards, the prosecutor tried to get her to plead guilty, but she refused.78 She 
did, however, return all of the furniture to TRS and pay the entire debt. Ms. 
Edwards hired an attorney, who succeeded in getting the criminal case against 
her dismissed.79 Before the case was dismissed, Ms. Edwards had to appear in 
court several times to respond to the charges initiated by TRS.80 
Ms. Edwards eventually filed a civil lawsuit against TRS and, after a jury trial, 
won a verdict on three claims, including malicious prosecution and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.81 Her success on these claims supports the 
assertion that TRS committed extortion. 
D. Creditors Commit Extortion When They Know The Consumer Has Not 
Committed a Crime But Nevertheless File Police Reports 
Based on the above conduct, TRS committed extortion by threatening to (and 
actually) exposing Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness to others and by threatening to 
(and actually) accusing her of a crime in order to force her to pay and turnover 
her furniture. 
Evidence produced by Ms. Edwards at trial shows TRS violated Oregon’s 
Uniform Debt Collection Practices Act by exposing Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness 
to others to coerce full payment from her.82 The Oregon act prohibits numerous 
collection practices, including “[c]ommunicat[ing] or threat[ing] to communicate 
with a debtor’s employer concerning the nature or existence of the debt.”83 A 
TRS employee not only showed up at Ms. Edwards’ job, but TRS employees also 
left several voicemail messages on a telephone line where her co-workers and 
supervisor heard that she owed TRS money.84 As a result, Ms. Edwards was 
 
 75.  Id. at ¶¶ 10–13. 
 76.  Id. at ¶ 18 
 77.  Amended Complaint, supra note 71, at ¶ 14. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  General Judgment at 2, Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 5497172 
(Or. Cir. Feb. 9, 2010). Ms. Edwards also won on her claim that TRS violated several provisions of the 
state’s debt collection law. Id.  
 82.  For a further explanation of the Oregon Uniform Debt Collection Practices Act, see Plaintiff’s 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at 6. See also OR. REV. 
STAT. § 646.639 (2015). 
 83.  OR. REV. STAT. § 646.639(2)(f).  
 84.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for JNOV and for New Trial at 12, Edwards 
v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 8593165 (Or. Cir. Oct. 6, 2010).  
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extremely embarrassed and did not want to go to work.85 The only question now 
is what did TRS’s employees intend by such actions. The purpose of the voicemail 
messages about Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness was to cause her to become 
embarrassed to such a degree that she would be coerced into either paying in full 
or turning over the furniture.86 Oregon case law has already recognized this 
unlawful collection method—revealing debts to the consumer’s employer—as 
prohibited precisely because it is an “abusive method[] [used] to pressure debtors 
to pay.”87 Accordingly, TRS’s conduct amounted to extortion. 
In addition to committing extortion by exposing Ms. Edwards’ indebtedness, 
TRS committed extortion by threatening to accuse her of a crime. As with the 
threats discussed in part II.B., these threats must be addressed because TRS and 
other RTO dealers will argue that the very existence of property-related theft 
crimes gives RTO dealers the right to file police reports and, thereby, protects 
them from prosecution for extortion. 
Ms. Edwards’ civil complaint against TRS failed to identify the specific crime 
TRS accused her of committing. However, she was most likely charged with 
criminal possession of rented or leased personal property, a felony in Oregon’s 
criminal code.88 The RTO industry has lobbied for the passage of laws 
criminalizing a consumer’s failure to pay for RTO property or failure to 
relinquish possession of RTO property.89 As a previous article explained in detail, 
consumers who obtain RTO merchandise are unlawfully being charged with 
crimes when they can no longer make the required payments.90 As one court has 
articulated, such a crime is a specific intent crime.91 Thus, simply showing that a 
consumer has failed to return RTO property does not meet the mens rea 
requirement.92 Moreover, based on the outcome of Ms. Edwards’ lawsuit against 
 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 12–13. 
 87.  See Porter v. Hill, 838 P.2d 45, 49 (Or. 1992).  
 88.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 164.140(1)(a).  
 89.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 57–58 (describing how RTO dealers in Florida lobbied state 
lawmakers to amend a criminal statute to make it easier to convict a consumer of a crime based on the 
consumer’s failure to turn over possession of RTO property). 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  See State v. Sanders, 905 So. 2d 241, 242–43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (Altenbernd, C.J., 
concurring). 
 92.  See id. Chief Judge Altenbernd further explained why intent to commit the theft crime could 
not be based on the fact that Ms. Sanders failed to return the RTO property after the company sent a 
demand letter: 
Maybe Ms. Sanders’ husband or boyfriend ran off with the furniture, and she cannot return it. 
Maybe her house burned down, and the furniture was destroyed. Maybe the landlord evicted 
her and kept the furniture. Maybe the furniture was destroyed in a hurricane. The point is that 
under the law established . . . mere proof that the certified letter was returned undeliverable 
would not actually be sufficient to establish . . . the intent for this crime of theft. Being poor and 
unable to pay your debts is still not a crime in Florida.  
Id. at 243 (emphasis added). See also Bert v. Commonwealth, No. 1499–10–1, 2011 WL 4916203, at *3 
(Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2011) (A Virginia court reversed the appellant’s conviction for failing to return an 
RTO television and held that “[a]lthough the Commonwealth’s evidence was sufficient to prove that 
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TRS, the company knew she had tried to make payments but refused to accept 
any more partial payments.93 The jury, therefore, found TRS liable for malicious 
prosecution because it initiated criminal proceedings against her without 
probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.94 Without probable cause 
to believe a crime had been committed, TRS’s motive in threatening to accuse 
her of a crime and eventually filing a police report against her was to coerce her 
into complying with its demands. That is extortion. 
Although TRS and other RTO dealers will argue they reasonably believe a 
crime is afoot when a customer fails to return RTO merchandise, courts and 
juries can readily peel back the thin veil of this argument by looking to the true 
purpose for calling the police. An analogous case, Lashley v. Bowman,95 is 
instructive on this point. There, a restaurant owner called the police after a 
patron, Ms. Lashley, refused to pay for lobster that she found inedible due to it 
being partially frozen.96 When the police officer arrived and heard the owner’s 
version of events, the police officer told Ms. Lashley that she had to pay for the 
food or she would be taken to jail.97 After the owner signed an affidavit stating 
that he wanted Ms. Lashley arrested for defrauding an innkeeper, the officer 
handcuffed Ms. Lashley on the spot and led her out of the restaurant into a squad 
car.98 Ms. Lashley fought the criminal charge, which was eventually dropped, and 
then sued the owner for malicious prosecution.99 
The court denied the owner’s motion to dismiss after determining that a jury 
could find that the owner lacked probable cause to believe Ms. Lashley had 
committed fraud on an innkeeper.100 Instead, “the true purpose and intent behind 
the [owner’s] calling the police was to attempt to coerce and intimidate this 
patron into paying money.”101 The owner admitted that he never tested or looked 
at the lobster to determine whether it was frozen or inedible.102 The owner also 
admitted that he assumed that Ms. Lashley would simply “pay up” and admitted  
  
 
appellant breached her written lease agreement with Crusader [the RTO company], the evidence failed, 
as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intended to defraud Crusader by 
failing to abide by the terms of the lease agreement.”).   
 93.  See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at ¶ 17 
(quoting and citing a TRS employee’s sworn declaration regarding the payment schedule Ms. Edwards 
was required to follow).  
 94.  To succeed on a claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove, among other things, a 
showing that the defendant did not have probable cause to believe the plaintiff had committed a crime. 
See STUART M. SPEISER, AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:4 (2017 Update). 
 95.  Lashley v. Bowman, 561 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. at 407–08. 
 99.  Id. at 407, 409. 
 100.  Id. at 408. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id at 407.  
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that “it’s never gone that far before, because when the police come, they always 
pay up and leave.”103 
Just like the restaurant owner in Lashley, TRS’s employees clearly used 
police officers to attempt to coerce Ms. Edwards into paying money or giving up 
the furniture.104 Her saved recordings of the voicemail messages left by the TRS 
employees demonstrate that they initially made several threats to have her 
arrested in order to get Ms. Edwards to comply.105 Also, the evidence at trial 
showed that the officers’ decision to arrest Ms. Edwards was based on employees’ 
statements falsely representing Ms. Edwards as refusing to make further 
payments.106 
The previously discussed Umana case is once again relevant because it dispels 
any notion that a defendant can avoid an extortion conviction by arguing that he 
or she believed a crime had been committed.107 In that case, that defendant 
Langshaw claimed that she believed Jared had had raped her when she was a 
minor.108 Therefore, she had a right to go the police department about this 
possible crime. The court held that, while Langshaw may have had the right to 
pursue statutory rape charges against Jared, she did not have the right to use the 
threat of criminal process as a means of collecting money on a potential civil claim 
against him.109 “The law does not contemplate the use of criminal process as a 
means of collecting a debt. To invoke such process for the purpose named is, as 
held by all authorities, contrary to public policy.”110 
Like Langshaw in Umana, TRS’s employees repeatedly threatened to have 
Ms. Edwards charged with a crime in order to collect on a civil debt, not because 
they thought she had committed a crime.111 If TRS’s employees had simply filed 
 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  See Amended Complaint, supra note 71, at ¶ 5.  
 105.  Id. at ¶¶ 5–10.  For example, an employee, who identified himself by name as the credit manager 
at TRS, left the following voicemail message: “I will get the authorities involved in this unless you call 
me and return my merchandise.” See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 70, at 3. The employee further threatened: “I promise you, Janelle, I will be at the courthouse, 
at the DA’s office. I will file charges against you. And if that stuff is in your mom’s house, I will file 
charges on her for receiving stolen merchandise.”  Id.  
 106.  See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for JNOV and for New Trial, supra note 
84, at 2–3 (quoting the deposition testimony of the arresting officers, who indicated that the TRS 
employees failed to produce several letters written by Ms. Edwards where she asked TRS to accept her 
payment). TRS’s employees falsely accused Ms. Edwards of selling the furniture to her mother and left 
voicemail messages threatening to have the mother arrested for receiving stolen merchandise. Id. Their 
threats to falsely accuse Ms. Edwards and her mother of crimes constituted extortion under Oregon law. 
See OR. REV. STAT. § 163.275(1)(e) (making it a crime to compel or induce another person to engage in 
conduct from which the person has the legal right to abstain by causing the person to fear being falsely 
accused of committing a crime or causing criminal charges to be filed against the person). 
 107.  See People v. Umana, 138 Cal. App. 4th 625, 640–42 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 108.  See id. at 628–29. 
 109.  See id. 
 110.  Id. at 640–41 (emphasis added). 
 111.  See generally General Judgment, Edwards v. TRS Home Furnishings, No. 0906-08151, 2010 WL 
5412242 (Or. Cir. Oct. 4, 2010).  
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a police report and had not made any threats, extortion could not be established. 
But that is not what happened. TRS’s filing of a police report came several weeks 
after TRS’s employees had made repeated threats to have Ms. Edwards arrested 
and threats to send the police to her place of employment.112 This conduct 
amounts to extortion. 
III 
CRIMINALIZATION VIA CREDITORS’ ABUSE OF CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCESS 
Rather than threatening and initiating criminal prosecution of consumers, 
some creditors engage in consumer debt criminalization by misusing the civil 
court system as a backdoor into the criminal justice system.113 Though civil 
contempt is technically a legitimate tool to use against debtors who fail to comply 
with court orders, payday lenders and other creditors misuse civil contempt when 
they have reason to believe that an oral examination is not likely to lead to the 
discovery of non-exempt assets that can be sold to pay civil debts. As 
demonstrated by the story of Wakita Shaw, this misuse induces in consumers a 
fear of being arrested for committing a crime, thereby coercing them into paying 
debts. 
A. One Consumer’s Trip To Jail For Civil Contempt 
Ms. Shaw’s road trip to jail started out innocently when she obtained a payday 
loan from Sunshine Title and Check Loan Company in St. Louis, Missouri.114 
After Ms. Shaw failed to repay a $425 loan, the payday lender obtained a default 
judgment against her and then filed the necessary documents that required Ms. 
Shaw to appear in court for an oral hearing.115 When she failed to appear, the 
lender then filed a civil contempt motion and eventually convinced a local judge 
to issue a body attachment order.116 This constituted a warrant for her arrest for 
failing to appear.117 Ms. Shaw was subsequently arrested.118 By then, the payday 
loan debt, including penalties and interest, had grown to $855, but she was then 
obligated to post bail of $1,250 to get out of jail.119 She was not allowed to use a 
 
 112.  See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at 
¶¶ 13–14 (stating that Ms. Edwards suffered physical illness, including fainting, after being overwhelmed 
with terror by the thought of getting arrested by Oregon police over the RTO debt).  
 113.  See, e.g., Chris Serres, Debt Lockup, 33 IRE J. 4, 4 (2010) (In a six-part series investigating debt-
related lawsuits filed in Minnesota, the reporters found warrants issued in “3,200 debt-related cases since 
2005, with the numbers of such cases soaring 60 percent in 2009.”). 
 114.  See Jim Gallagher, Payday Lenders Use Courts To Create Modern Debtor’s Prison, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/payday-lenders-use-courts-to-
create-modern-debtors-prison/article_f56ca6aa-e880-11e1-b154-0019bb30f31a.html [https://perma.cc/9V 
Y2-W 4M8]. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
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bail bondsman. This meant she had to pay the full $1,250 amount, instead of a 
fraction of that amount, to be released.120 Desperate to get out of jail so that she 
could keep her job, Ms. Shaw, a single mother of a toddler, ended up spending 
three days in jail before her mother obtained the $1,250 needed to secure Ms. 
Shaw’s freedom.121 
Ms. Shaw’s story is not an isolated case. Missouri courts do not keep track of 
the number of body attachment orders issued in cases involving civil debts.122 
However, Legal Services of Eastern Missouri found that one attorney who 
represents creditors requested fifty-five debtors to appear for oral examinations 
and had requested twenty-three body attachment orders in 2011 and 2012 alone, 
resulting in the arrests of seven people.123 News stories and legal notices in 
Missouri and other states describe creditors obtaining civil contempt orders after 
debtors have failed to appear for an oral examination.124 
Like Missouri, every state has a post-judgment procedural process for 
creditors to invoke to try to satisfy a judgment.125 That process may start with the 
creditor’s request for the debtor to answer written interrogatories or appear at 
an oral examination.126 Ostensibly, this post-judgment hearing allows a creditor 
to discover whether the debtor has assets to pay the judgment by allowing the 
creditor to ask questions and request documents and other information regarding 
assets.127 If a debtor fails to appear, the creditor can then obtain a hearing to show 
cause in order to hold the debtor in civil contempt.128 After the debtor fails to 
appear at the show-cause hearing, state statutes authorize the issuance of an 
arrest warrant (or body attachment in Missouri) allowing local police to arrest 
the debtor without any further opportunity to appear before the court.129 The bail 
is usually set at an amount equal to or higher than the debt owed.130 Once paid 
 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  In some communities, the local newspaper identifies individuals arrested on the basis of civil 
contempt for failing to appear in court. See, e.g., Arrests, DAILY REV. ATLAS (Monmouth, Ill.) (Sept. 2, 
2015), 2015 WLNR 29323083 (reporting arrests of individuals residing in Warren County and adjacent 
counties). Investigative reporters have occasionally sifted through court filings and discovered that 
creditors are increasingly using the civil contempt process in debt-related cases. See, e.g., Serres, supra 
note 113.  
 125.  See, e.g., 5A COLO. PRAC., HANDBOOK ON CIVIL LITIGATION § 12:1, 2–3 (2015). 
 126.  See, e.g., JAMES J. BROWN, JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT § 11.11 (3d ed. 2016) (stating that 
“[d]iscovery concerning a judgment debtor’s assets may be had by way of written interrogatories or 
through oral examination”). 
 127.  Id. at 3. 
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id.  
 130.  See, e.g., 6B Fed. Proc. Forms § 19:162 (“After the defendant is taken into custody, he or she 
may contest the issuance of the arrest order by challenging its legality or the defendant may post bond in 
an amount sufficient to insure the satisfaction of a judgment on plaintiff’s claim and thereby secure his 
or her release”). 
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by the consumer, it is turned over to the creditor.131 In some jurisdictions, like 
Missouri, the person must pay the full amount of the bail to be released.132 
Moreover, because the consumer has not technically been charged with a crime, 
the consumer has no right to a court-appointed attorney.133 Unsophisticated and 
unrepresented consumers are easily intimidated into finding a way to pay in order 
to get out of jail. 
B. Creditor’s Request For An Oral Examination Of The Debtor Is a Pretext To 
Achieving a Civil Contempt Order And Arrest Warrant 
Without a lawyer, the typical consumer will not be able to determine whether 
creditors are intentionally misusing the civil contempt process. Most consumers 
do not file an answer to complaints involving debt collection and most do not 
appear in court to defend themselves.134 This is because the majority of consumers 
cannot afford to hire a consumer lawyer to represent them.135 Creditors, including 
 
 131.  See, e.g., Kelly M. Greco & Stephanie R. Hammer, No More ‘Debtors’ Prison’: Greater Notice, 
Protections for Judgment Debtors, 101 ILL. B.J. 134, 136 (2013) (discussing that prior to the 2012 changes 
in Illinois law, “when issuing a body attachment for failure to appear, judges [in Illinois] would often set 
the debtor’s release bond at the amount of the debt and then turn the bond money over to the creditor”). 
Proving the legality or illegality of the money being immediately turned over to the creditor and not to 
the clerk of court is beyond the scope of this article. The point here is to show that creditors are 
incentivized to use the civil contempt process as a debt collection tactic if consumers find a way to pay, 
and the money is then immediately given to the creditors. 
 132.  See id.  
 133.  See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. RULE 31.02(a) (describing when a person accused of a crime is entitled a 
court-appointed attorney). Wakita Shaw is a resident of St. Louis Missouri, which is not far from 
Ferguson, where Michael Brown, an unarmed African-American teen, was shot to death by a police 
officer. Andrea Marsh & Emily Gerrick, Why Motive Matters: Designing Effective Policy Responses to 
Modern Debtors’ Prisons, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 98 (2015). Many issues came to light from civil 
protests about his death. Id. at 98. Relevant to this article was the practice among Ferguson police officers 
of issuing traffic citations to mostly African-American residents of Ferguson. Id. (“Investigations that 
sought to illuminate the causes and scope of community resentment and unrest in Ferguson revealed that 
a largely White police force issued numerous minor citations to the city’s majority Black residents. 
Citations carried steep costs that would grow quickly over time if an individual did not pay promptly—
such that a single ticket with a $151 fine could balloon to a debt of more than $1,000.”). In a pending 
federal lawsuit against the Ferguson, the district court allowed the plaintiffs to go forward with their 
equal protection claim that the Ferguson violated their constitutional rights by incarcerating them over 
unpaid traffic fines but not assigning court-appointed counsel for the indigent plaintiffs. See Fant v. City 
of Ferguson, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2015). 
 134.  The fact that consumers do not respond to debt collection complaints is without controversy and 
that has been the case for decades. See, e.g., Letter from Donald S. Clark, Sec., Fed. Trade Comm’n to 
The Honorable Richard Cordray, Director, CFPB, (F.T.C. Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/ 
system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-enforcement-fair-debt-collection-practices-ac 
t-report-consumer-financial/160217cfpbreport2015fdcpa.pdf [https://perma.cc/NWC6-H4XT].  
 135.  See APRIL KUEHNHOFF & CHERIE CHING, DEFUSING DEBT: A SURVEY OF DEBT-RELATED 
CIVIL LEGAL AID PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (June 2016), http://www.nclc.org/images/ 
pdf/debt_collection/debt-defense-survey-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CR3-2LRM] (stating that the debt 
collection industry makes over a billion contacts with consumers annually and files lawsuits against 
millions and finding that companies obtain default judgments against consumers in the vast majority of 
those cases). The majority of consumers that seek free legal representation are turned away due to 
reduced funding available to legal aid organizations. Id. at 1. See also Debra Cassens Weiss, Middle-Class 
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debt collection companies, already know that in most consumer debt cases, they 
will obtain a default judgment.136 Because the trajectory in consumer debt cases 
usually leads to a default judgment, some creditors have exploited the consumer’s 
lack of response and sophistication to evade consumer protection laws in various 
ways, including by getting default judgments on time-barred debts137 and using 
default judgments to unlawfully garnish consumers’ wages.138 This means the 
filing of a lawsuit in a consumer debt case yields low-hanging fruit, and sometimes 
that fruit is unlawfully obtained. Thus, unscrupulous creditors already have an 
incentive to use civil litigation to unlawfully collect debts from consumers. 
Given that civil litigation is used against consumers to unlawfully collect 
debts, payday lenders and other high-cost lenders misuse civil contempt because 
they know or have reason to know that an oral examination is not likely to reveal 
assets that can lawfully be seized and sold. Therefore, the oral examination 
request is a pretext for reaching the ultimate goal of obtaining a civil contempt 
order and arrest warrant. Three main insights support this contention. 
First, the high-cost lenders described in this article have established business 
models that extend exorbitantly priced credit to consumers who have no other 
options to satisfy their credit needs and are, therefore, financially vulnerable.139 
 
Dilemma: Can’t Afford Lawyers, Can’t Qualify for Legal Aid, AM. B. ASS’N J. (July 22, 2010, 1:36 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/middleclass_dilemma_cant_afford_lawyers_cant_qualify_for_le
gal_aid (explaining why middle-class individuals cannot afford legal representation). 
 136.  KUEHNHOFF & CHING, supra note 135, at 1.  
 137.  See, e.g., Diaz v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, No. 10 Civ. 3920, 2012 WL 1882976, at *2 
(E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012) (“Defendants’ filing of the [current lawsuit] was part of a ‘policy and practice’ 
whereby Defendants intentionally filed time-barred claims ‘knowing that the vast majority of claims filed 
will result in default judgments or will be contested by unsophisticated pro-se consumers who are 
unaware of [state consumer protection law] and its impact upon the statute of limitations.’”).  
 138.  See, e.g., Yu v. Signet Bank/Virginia, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1377 (1999) (holding that a bank’s “long-
arm program” constituted an abuse of process and an unlawful business practice where the bank filed 
lawsuits in Virginia courts against its out-of-state credit-card holders, obtained default judgments in more 
than ninety percent of the cases, and collected millions using Virginia’s garnishment procedures to 
garnish the wages of out-of-state cardholders). 
 139.  For instance, the crux of the payday lending business model is to lend money to credit-
challenged consumers who need cash to pay a bill and who lack any other viable options to solve their 
financial crisis. See generally Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do 
Payday and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524 (2012). 
Furthermore, car title lenders, RTO companies, and other high-cost lenders extend credit to cash-
strapped consumers with bad credit. Id. Women and minorities are disproportionately represented 
among payday loan borrowers, RTO customers, and car title borrowers. See, e.g., id.; Kathryn Fritzdixon 
et al., Dude, Where’s My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1029 (2014) (reporting findings of a study, and specifically finding “women are 
slightly more likely than men to use auto title loans” and that this finding is similar to demographic data 
showing that “[w]omen are also more likely to use payday loans, pawnshops, and rent-to-own services”). 
Evidence suggests that women and minorities are specifically targeted by predatory lenders. See, e.g., Jim 
Hawkins, Are Bigger Companies Better for Low-Income Borrowers?: Evidence from Payday and Title 
Loan Advertisements, 11 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 303, 325 (2015) (reporting the results of the author’s study 
of advertisements by payday and car title lenders and finding “[l]arge companies are more likely to have 
storefront advertisements aimed at racial minorities than small companies at a statistically significant 
level, and large companies are more likely to have websites dominated by pictures of racial minorities”). 
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All of these companies charge triple-digit (or higher) interest rates and impose 
loan repayment terms that make it likely that consumers will default and will 
enter into long-term cycles of indebtedness140 or lose possession of their assets.141 
As a result, these high-cost lenders are subject to state and federal regulations to 
curb their lending practices and are targeted in pending federal regulations 
announced by the CFPB.142 
Second, financial data revealed about consumers who rely on high-cost 
consumer credit further highlights the pretextual nature of requests for oral 
examinations. In comparison to individuals who do not obtain high-cost loans, 
consumers that use the high-cost forms of consumer credit have lower income, 
lack savings, and have less wealth (for instance, they are not likely to be 
homeowners).143 Because consumers who obtain exorbitantly priced loans have 
less income, garnishment of their wages by creditors may result in smaller 
payments over time from the consumer’s income. This is because applicable 
 
 140.  See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS ON PAYDAY, PAYDAY 
INSTALLMENT, AND VEHICLE TITLE LOANS, AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS 111 (2016), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Supplemental_Report_060116.pdf [https://perma.cc/CLR3 
-8ZDH] [hereinafter CFPB’S 2016 SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS] (reporting results from data collection 
that included over twelve million payday loans issued in thirty states within a twelve-month period and 
finding that “[o]ver 80% of payday loans are reborrowed within 14 days from the same lender, 85% are 
reborrowed within 30 days, and 88% are reborrowed within 60 days”); Ann Constable, Judge Orders 
FastBucks to Pay Restitution to Borrowers, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Sept. 27, 2012),  http://www.santa 
fenewmexican.com/news/local_news/judge-orders-fastbucks-to-pay-restitution-to-borrowers/article_01f 
ea39d-4be3-5eb8-80fc-f2b8efcbd057.html [https://perma.cc/88E2-SY3F] (announcing a victory by the 
New Mexico Attorney General in a case it filed against FastBucks, a payday lender that issued 
“installment” loans to take advantage of consumers to keep them in long-term debt and describing the 
testimony of one FastBucks employee who stated: “[w]e just basically don’t let anybody pay off [a 
loan]”). See also Decision and Final Order, New Mexico v. Fastbucks Holding Corp., No. D0101-CV-
2009-01917, at ¶ 15 (N.M. Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.creditslips.org/files/fastbucks-decision-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/55UG-VQ93] (“Given borrowers’ financial conditions, it was knowable ab initio that 
they would be unable to repay their loans without accruing exorbitant interest.”). 
 141.  See, e.g., Default Judgment and Final Order for Permanent Injunction, Schuette vs. Liquidation, 
LLC, No. 16-30-CP, at 5, (June 8, 2016) https://web.archive.org/web/20170416170156/http://www. 
michigan.gov/documents/ag/6_8_16_Filed_Default_Judgment__Final_Order_for_Permanent_Injunctio
n_526342_7.pdf  (enjoining car title lenders, which were not licensed to do business in Michigan, from 
operating in the state and finding that they had unlawfully repossessed at least 154 vehicles from 
Michigan residents).  
 142.  In June of 2016, the CFPB proposed new rules to curb the abuses of payday loans, auto title 
loans, and other forms of short-term credit. CFPB Proposal Looks to End Payday Loan Debt Traps, 
FED. BANKING L. REP. ¶¶ 154–379 (June 2, 2016); Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost 
Installment Loans (proposed June 2, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/Rulemaking_Payday_Vehicle_Title_Certain_High-Cost_ 
Installment_Loans.pdf [https://perma.cc/76PH-4V5P] [hereinafter CFPB’s Proposed Rules]. 
 143.  For an in-depth discussion of the financial data about payday and car title loan borrowers, see 
Nathalie Martin & Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title Loans Really 
Serve the Middle Class?, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 524 (2012). See also Bridge Fund Capital Corp. v. 
Fastbucks Franchise Corp., 622 F.3d 996, 999 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The payday industry targets low to 
medium income consumers as well as individuals who have no savings, and live paycheck to paycheck.”); 
Jim Hawkins, Renting the Good Life, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2041, 2066 (2008) (stating that consumers 
who enter into RTO contracts with the intent to own are less likely to have household incomes greater 
than $25,000, are less likely to own their homes, and more likely to lack a high school diploma). 
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federal and state laws protect the majority (usually seventy-five percent) of a 
consumer’s disposable income from attachment.144 
In addition to earning less income, consumers who use high-cost credit 
disproportionately receive part or all of their income from sources that are 
exempted from attachment under federal or state law.145 For example, various 
state and federal laws protect child support payments, disability income, Social 
Security income, and similar types of income sources.146 As a result, a 
garnishment proceeding may yield nothing.147 This may explain why some high-
cost lenders do not even attempt to directly garnish a consumer’s source of 
income before resorting to civil contempt proceedings. 
Although laws explicitly protect numerous sources of income, Professor Lea 
Shepard and others have found that consumers facing arrest or wanting release 
from jail may use exempted income sources to pay the amount that the creditor 
claim is owed.148 As a result, creditors that misuse the civil contempt process 
circumvent exemption laws by using arrest warrants to coerce consumers into 
paying with the same funds that are ostensibly protected by law.  
Third, consumers who borrow from high-cost lenders are likely to have 
tangible assets (e.g., furniture) protected under personal property exemption 
laws and, therefore, lack assets that a creditor can seize and sell.149 Financial data 
 
 144.  See, e.g., John Terrill & Jennifer Kosteva, Asset Protection Planning: Understanding the Links 
and the Conflicts Between Estate Planning and Debtor/Creditor Law, AM. L. INST. 711 (describing 
personal property and income exemption laws in the United States, and stating that, for example, 
Georgia law allows a creditor to garnish from disposable earnings “the lesser of (i) twenty-five percent 
of weekly after-tax earnings and (ii) the amount by which after-tax weekly income exceeds thirty times 
the federal minimum hourly wage”). 
 145.  See, e.g., CFPB DATA POINT: PAYDAY LENDING, CFPB OFF. RES. (Mar. 2014), 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb_report_payday-lending.pdf [https://perma.cc/9396-DS 
7Q] (reporting data that shows, among other things, that the majority of borrowers who are paid monthly 
receive income from governmental benefits, such as Social Security payments and Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI)). 
 146.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2010) (“The right of any person to any future [Social Security] 
payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of 
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter shall be subject to execution, levy, 
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or insolvency 
law.”). 
 147.  See, e.g., Philpott v. Essex Cty. Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 417 (1973) (explaining that the 
wording in § 407 “imposes a broad bar against the use of any legal process to reach all social security 
benefits [and] [t]hat is broad enough to include all claimants, including a State”). 
 148.  See, e.g., Lea Shepard, Creditors’ Contempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1536 (2011); Brief For 
AARP as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gillie v. Law Office of Eric A. Jones, LLC, 785 F.3d 
1091, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom Sheriff v. Gillie, 193 L. Ed. 495 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2015) 
(No. 15-338), available at 2016 WL 878848 (describing how debt collectors threaten to have elderly 
consumers arrested and threaten to seize their Social Security checks and explaining the vulnerability of 
elderly consumers that may lead them to pay the amount demanded, even when they do not owe it, to 
avoid being arrested).  
 149.  Every state has exemption laws that protect a certain amount of personal property, and all or 
part of the value of the debtor’s primary residence, from being seized and sold by unsecured creditors 
seeking satisfaction of consumer debts. Daniel A. Austin, State Laws, Court Splits, Local Practice Make 
Consumer Bankruptcy Anything but “Uniform,” 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1 (2011). In addition to state 
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indicates that consumers who obtain high-cost loans lack savings and have fewer 
assets, including lacking ownership of a home. If the consumer who borrowed 
money from a high-cost lender has no savings in the bank, does not own a house, 
and lacks a car (or the car is encumbered by a perfected security interest), then 
the odds are very high that the consumer’s remaining personal assets are 
comparatively worth little and will be protected under state exemption laws.150 
Lawyers who regularly represent creditors in consumer cases should already 
know this.151 That is precisely why experienced lawyers recommend that any 
attorney representing a creditor first investigate the availability of non-exempt 
assets before filing a lawsuit against the debtor.152 
The news report about Ms. Shaw revealed a disturbing track record of one 
lawyer, Mitchell Jacobs, who regularly represents payday lenders and other 
creditors and requests oral examinations.153 In one year, he had summoned 
dozens of consumers to appear for oral examinations and, due to the failure of 
some to appear, had requested twenty-three body attachment orders (or arrest 
warrants), which resulted in the arrests of seven consumers.154 When Mr. Jacobs 
was questioned about his practices, he stated: “If they’ve had notice and they fail 
to appear, then they get what they deserve.”155 His answer does not indicate these 
consumers had non-exempt assets but refused to appear. His track record should 
be cause for concern about the misuse of civil contempt because it puts extreme 
 
law, various federal laws provide consumers with a variety of exemptions. See, e.g., ROSEMARY E. 
WILLIAMS, 1 BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE HANDBOOK § 2:9 n.26 (2d ed. & 2016 Update) (identifying 
several exempt property interests, such as payments to winners of the congressional Medal of Honor, 
that are available under federal laws and that are not dependent on a person filing bankruptcy). 
 150.  The majority of Americans have personal property items that fall within exemption limits and, 
therefore, cannot be seized by unsecured creditors. Moreover, the vast majority of Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
cases are labeled as no-asset cases, which means unsecured creditors receive nothing because there are 
no assets available to be taken and sold for payment of their debts. See In re Plourde, 418 B.R. 495 (B.A.P. 
1st Cir. 2009) (citing data and stating that in the few Chapter 7 cases where assets exist, unsecured 
creditors receive only partial payment of their debts). 
 151.  I spent most of my private practice representing creditors. I was trained to first determine 
whether the debtor had non-exempt assets and make sure they were not subject to a pre-existing lien or 
a security interest. It was considered unethical to drive up legal fees by filing lawsuits unless we could 
determine the debtor had unencumbered, non-exempt assets to satisfy any potential judgment. At the 
very least, we were expected to verify whether such assets existed in order to retain our clients and avoid 
any potential malpractice lawsuits. Simply obtaining the consumer’s credit report would indicate if the 
consumer has a home subject to a mortgage or a car subject to a security interest. For the majority of 
consumers, these two assets are the most valuable and if they are already subject to pre-existing perfected 
liens, then a judgment creditor, such as a payday lender, has no reason to believe that valuable non-
exempt assets exist to satisfy its judgment.  
 152.  “Creditor’s counsel should try to discover what property the debtor has that can be levied 
upon . . . , whether such property is subject to liens or encumbrances, and whether there are other 
judgments against the debtor.” Evaluating the Claim, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE ENF. J. & DEBT 3-A (2016) 
(describing the steps in conducting an investigation of the debtor’s assets and stating that “an 
investigation should usually be completed before a creditor decides whether to bring suit against an 
uncooperative debtor”).  
 153.  Gallagher, supra note 114. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id.  
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pressure on consumers to come up with the money demanded. For example, 
Wakita Shaw’s mother borrowed from someone else to get Ms. Shaw out of jail.156 
As the late Paul Harvey would say, “here’s the rest of the story”157 about 
Wakita Shaw, which shows the payday lender’s oral examination request would 
not have led to the discovery of non-exempt assets. Perhaps predictably, a few 
months after getting out of jail, Ms. Shaw ended up filing bankruptcy to get a 
fresh start from her indebtedness.158 Her bankruptcy petition revealed this 
mother of a toddler received part of her income from child support payments—
an exempted source of income that the payday lender could not have garnished.159 
The petition also revealed that she did not own a home, and she did not have any 
collectible assets because all of her personal property was protected by 
exemption laws or subject to security interests.160 The bottom line is that she did 
not have any personal property that the payday lender could have seized and 
sold. Consequently, one can reasonably conclude the civil contempt process is 
exploited by the payday lender to force consumers to get money from someone 
else to pay the civil debts owed. Practice-oriented articles even advise lawyers 
that they will accomplish receipt of payment from the debtor by following 
through on the civil contempt process.161 This paints a picture of extortion. 
Therefore, it is time for prosecutors to consider going after creditors that misuse 
civil contempt. 
C. Creditors’ Abuse Of Civil Contempt Constitutes Extortion 
When lenders misuse the civil contempt process, they commit extortion 
because the process constitutes an implied threat that consumers will be 
prosecuted for committing a crime.162 Once again, the Umana163 case is relevant 
because Langshaw argued that her letter, which demanded weekly payments 
totaling $50,000, was merely an attempt to settle a legitimate civil claim against 
the man she believed had raped her.164 Although Langshaw’s letter stated that 
she “would like to settle this matter,” the court held that, in light of her conduct 
 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Mr. Harvey was a legendary syndicated radio columnist who hosted a program called “The Rest 
of the Story” in which he uncovered and delved in little-known facts behind stories. See generally, PAUL 
HARVEY, JR., PAUL HARVEY’S THE REST OF THE STORY (1977). 
 158.  Wakita Shaw, Petition, Case No. 12-50325, (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 25, 2012). 
 159.  Id. Sch. I.  
 160.  Id. Schs. A, B & D. Her vehicle was subject to a car title loan. Id. Even her daughter’s bedroom 
set was subject to a security interest. Id. 
 161.  See, e.g., Ronald S. Carter, Collection of Contract Debts, MD. INST. FOR CONTINUING PROF’L 
EDUC. LAW., INC. (2012) (“If the debtor again fails to appear for the show cause hearing [regarding the 
civil contempt], then file for a body attachment. Body attachments are usually rather effective, as most 
debtors do not like to be imprisoned and suddenly find funds for bonds.”). 
 162.  States have criminal extortion statutes that define a threat to accuse someone of a crime as 
unlawful.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 519(2) (2015). 
 163.  People v. Umana, 138 Cal. App. 4th 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 164.  Id. at 639. 
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and the entire letter, her letter threatened “to continue accusing the victim of 
crime.” Consequently, Langshaw had “the specific intent to extort money and 
other property from him.”165 
Applying the Umana to the payday lender’s treatment of Wakita Shaw, a 
court could conclude that the payday lender committed extortion. Lawfully 
initiating the civil contempt process does not shield the lender from an extortion 
conviction.166 The news report about Ms. Shaw is silent about her 
communications with the lender between the time of her arrest and her release 
from jail. After being arrested, either Ms. Shaw or her mother probably tried to 
contact the lender’s lawyer to find a way for Ms. Shaw to be released from jail.167 
If the lawyer communicated with Ms. Shaw (or with her mother) any words 
implying that Ms. Shaw would be released if she paid the debt, then a fact finder 
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the lender, through its lawyer, 
made an implicit threat to continue criminal action against Ms. Shaw until she 
paid the debt.168 
Regardless of the communications, the creditor’s misuse of civil contempt 
created the impression in Ms. Shaw’s mind that she was being arrested for failing 
to pay back a loan, not for failing to appear in court. Without legal training, 
consumers believe they are being arrested for committing a crime related to the 
unpaid debt.169 That belief is justified by the consumer looking at the style or 
caption of the written body attachment order because it will have the same 
heading as in the initial complaint filed against the consumer.170 If shown the 
written order from the court, the lender’s name will still be listed as the plaintiff 
and the consumer’s name will still be listed as the defendant. 
The consumer’s belief that the arrest is due to an unpaid debt is further 
cemented by the fact that once the consumer pays the bail amount, which is 
 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  The Umana case demonstrates that a defendant cannot avoid an extortion conviction just 
because the defendant claims to rely on our civil system of resolving disputes.  See, e.g., id. at 640–41. 
 167.  I base this assertion on my law practice experience, which consisted primarily of representing 
creditors in state-court collection cases and in bankruptcy cases. It was a common occurrence for a 
consumer–debtor to contact me once they had been served with a complaint. I would then tell the 
consumer that I represented the creditor and could not give him or her legal advice. I would instruct the 
consumer to retain his or her own attorney. Unfortunately, it is incontrovertible that the majority of 
Americans do not have access to free or low-cost legal advice. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying 
text. For a summer, I worked as attorney at Neighborhood Legal Services Association where I 
encountered clients, most of whom were not competent by themselves to deal with a creditor’s attorney.  
 168.  Although this article does not contend that lawyers should be criminally prosecuted, lawyers 
have been convicted of extortion on various grounds, including making threats to accuse a client’s 
customer of a crime. See, e.g., People v. Beggs, 172 P. 152, 153 (Cal. 1918).  
 169.  See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 148, at 1536.  In her article describing the use of civil contempt as 
a debt collection mechanism, Professor Lea Shepard explains numerous reasons why debtors fail to 
appear. A primary reason is the consumer lacks understanding of the implication of failing to appear. Id. 
(stating also that “[i]n the area of debt collection, debtors’ lack of sophistication is reflected, among other 
things, in their unfamiliarity with their state and federal exemption rights”).  
 170.  See, e.g., Judgment Ordering Body Attachment, 1A Fla. Pl. & Pr. Forms § 6:172.  
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turned over to the creditor, the consumer is released from jail.171 As Professor 
Alan White explained, “[i]f, in effect, people are being incarcerated until they 
pay bail, and bail is being used to pay their debts, then they’re being incarcerated 
to pay their debts.”172 Then, according to the holding of Umana, neither the 
lender nor its lawyer needed to explicitly accuse Ms. Shaw of committing a crime.  
Another recent case supports the conclusion that the payday lender could be 
convicted of extortion absent direct threats. In People v. Bollaert, the defendant 
operated a website, UGotPosted.com, through which users could post naked and 
intimate photographs of individuals, along with their names, locations, and social 
media profile links.173 Individuals who wanted their pictures removed were 
directed to another Bollaert website, ChangeMyReputation.com, where they 
could pay a fee to have the offensive content removed from the other website.174 
Bollaert was charged with several crimes, including extortion, and eventually 
convicted of extortion based on the threat to expose the secrets of individuals and 
subject them to disgrace (namely, shame and humiliation).175 
Bollaert challenged the extortion conviction on the basis that he did not 
initiate any direct communications to any individuals or make any threats to 
those who wanted the offensive content removed.176 The court rejected this 
argument and found an implicit threat from the fact that the offensive content 
would not be removed unless the victims paid.177 Bollaert’s actions had already 
taken away (or at least invaded) the victims’ privacy and constituted an implicit 
threat to subject them to continued disgrace, embarrassment, and humiliation by 
keeping the intimate photos on his website if they failed to pay the required fee.178 
Similar to the Bollaert case, an implicit threat can be found in the fact that the 
payday lender, via its lawyer, had already taken Ms. Shaw’s freedom by having 
her arrested over a civil debt and that she could only be freed if she paid what 
was demanded. According to the reasoning in the Bollaert decision, neither the 
 
 171.  See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 114.  
 172.  Chris Serres, Debtors and the New Breed of Collectors: Is Jailing Debtors the Same as Debtors’ 
Jail?, STAR TRIB., June 6, 2010, at A9. 
 173.  People v. Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). This type of website is commonly 
referred to as a “revenge porn” website where jilted ex-spouses and lovers can shame their exes by 
posting nude or similar photos of them online. See Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of 
State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 775 (2017). 
 174.  Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 819.  
 175.  Besides inducing fear based on a threat to accuse someone of crime, as was the case in Umana, 
California law also states that extortion includes inducing fear by a threat “[t]o expose, or impute to [a 
person] . . . a deformity, disgrace, or crime” or “expose a secret affecting him [or her].” CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 519. 
 176.  Bollaert, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 820. 
 177.  Id. at 837 (“The fact Bollaert did not take affirmative action to seek out or contact the victims, 
but merely responded to the victims’ pleas to remove their content, does not render the threat element 
unsupported by the evidence.”). 
 178.  Id. (“There is no question based on the victims’ testimony that the display of their private images 
and information subjected them to shame, disgrace and embarrassment as to their reputation and 
character, and would continue to be exposed to other people if the content was not removed”). 
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lender nor its lawyer needed to initiate contact with Ms. Shaw after her arrest. 
Similar to the victims in Bollaert who had already been subjected to humiliation, 
Ms. Shaw was already sitting in jail, ostensibly for committing a crime due the 
lender’s misuse of civil contempt. Because jail is for those accused of crimes, it 
was reasonable for Ms. Shaw to infer that she had been accused of a crime and 
that the lender would continue accusing her of a crime related to the payday loan 
debt. She could only get out of jail by heeding the demands of the payday lender 
to pay. That amounts to extortion. 
D. Creditors Cannot Hide Behind Their Technically Legal Use Of Civil 
Contempt Or Their Belief That The Consumer Owed a Debt 
Creditors may contend that because the civil contempt process is legal, they 
do not have the requisite intent to commit a crime. But in numerous contexts, 
courts have held that asserting a claim of right can nevertheless constitute 
extortion when it is used to get money or other property from the victim. For 
instance, in Roberts v. State, a Texas appellate court upheld the conviction of a 
defendant who claimed that he was relying on a civil rule when he asked for a 
settlement of potential claims.179 The defendant, Ted Roberts, sent drafts of 
discovery petitions to four men that had had sexual affairs with his wife.180 Under 
Texas’ rules of civil procedure, before filing a lawsuit, a person can file a petition 
to obtain a discovery order to allow that person to obtain deposition testimony 
from someone else.181 The purpose of this pre-lawsuit discovery rule is to “to 
perpetuate the testimony of witnesses for use in an anticipated suit” and “to 
investigate a potential claim or suit.”182 In the petitions, Roberts requested the 
court’s permission to investigate potential claims and highlighted various sections 
of the Texas Penal Code.183 He asked the four men to settle his potential claims 
against them by either paying him directly or sending money to his favorite 
charity.184 All four paid the amount requested and signed agreements to settle 
Roberts’ claims against them.185 Roberts was eventually convicted of two crimes, 
one constituting theft by coercion.186 
 
 179.  Roberts v. State, 278 S.W.3d 778 (Tex. App. 2008). 
 180.  Id. at 783–84. 
 181.  TEX. R. Civ. PROC. 202.1(b) (“A person may petition the court for an order authorizing the 
taking of a deposition or oral examination or written questions . . . to investigate a potential claim or 
suit.”).  
 182.  KNOX D. NUNNALLY & RONALD G. FRANKLIN, 3 TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE TORTS § 12:122 
(2016 Update). 
 183.  Roberts, 278 S.W.3d at 785. 
 184.  Id. at 784–87. 
 185.  Id. at 785–88. 
 186.  Id. at 790. Under Texas law, a person commits theft if he “unlawfully appropriates property with 
intent to deprive the owner of property.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(a) (2015). The appropriation of 
property is “unlawful” when it is without the owner’s effective consent. TEX. PENAL CODE § 31.03(b) 
(2015). Consent is lacking if obtained by coercion, which includes threats to accuse a person of an offense 
or expose the person to ridicule or contempt. TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(9)(C)–(D) (2011). 
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Under Texas law, threats amounting to coercion include threats “to accuse a 
person of any offense,” to “expose a person to hatred, contempt or ridicule,” or 
to “harm the credit or business repute of any person.”187 The court concluded that 
the testimonies of Roberts’ victims were sufficient to support his conviction for 
making those threats.188 For example, one man testified that he believed the 
petition draft Roberts gave to him was a threat to accuse him of various crimes 
arising from his affair with Roberts’ wife.189 Another victim testified that he 
settled because he believed the petition, if filed, “would be embarrassing,” 
“would cause people to lose confidence in him,” and would cause him to lose his 
job.190 Therefore, the court held that a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Roberts used coercion to obtain the settlements, and that his use of the 
discovery petitions was “not based on his reliance on the validity of his legal 
claims but in an effort to threaten and deceive the men.”191 
Likewise, a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that a lender’s use of 
the civil contempt process is employed to obtain an arrest warrant to coerce 
consumers into paying out of fear of being charged with a crime if they do not 
pay. Although one of the victims in Roberts thought he was being accused of 
crime, most people know that committing adultery is not a crime in the United 
States.192 However, consumers who are arrested via civil contempt have every 
reason to believe they are being accused of a crime. If they are told they can be 
released if they pay in full, that information would confirm their perception that 
they have been accused of a crime arising from the unpaid civil debt. 
Consequently, creditors cannot escape an extortion conviction simply by 
asserting that they legally used civil contempt to have consumers arrested. 
Similarly, creditors cannot avoid an extortion conviction by asserting as a 
defense the fact that the victim owed a valid debt. In People v. Fichtner,193 the 
court upheld the convictions of two defendants who threatened to have a person 
prosecuted for shoplifting after he had stolen food items.194 After the defendants 
made several demands, the accused shoplifter signed an agreement requiring 
restitution by immediately paying $25 to the defendants and promising to pay the 
remaining debt balance in installments.195 Appealing their convictions, the 
defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed not to convict if the 
 
 187.  TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(9)(C)–(E) (2011). 
 188.  Roberts, 278 S.W.3d at 793. 
 189.  Id.  
 190.  Id.  
 191.  Id. at 794. 
 192.  Adultery is still a crime in some countries. See, e.g., Carlin Moore et al., International Legal 
Updates, 16 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 36, 41 (2009) (stating that Iran had executed individuals for various crimes, 
including adultery). 
 193.  People v. Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952). 
 194.  Id. at 394, 399. 
 195.  Id. at 394. 
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defendants honestly believed the victim owed the money.196 The court disagreed 
and held that such a jury instruction would be incorrect under the law.197 The 
bottom line is that public policy condemns the means by which these defendants 
choose to collect debts.198  
In accordance with the reasoning of People v. Fichtner, creditors that misuse 
civil contempt cannot escape extortion convictions because this collection 
practice contravenes public policy as it terrorizes consumers into paying civil 
debts. Likewise, creditors that initiate criminal charges, or that only threaten to 
do so, should not be able to avoid extortion convictions because these practices 
constitute unlawful collection methods that violate public policy, even when civil 
debts are legitimately owed. 
  
 
 196.  Id. at 396. 
 197.  “[D]efendants may properly be convicted even though they believed that the complainant was 
guilty of the theft of their employer’s goods in an amount either equal to or less, or greater than any sum 
of money obtained from the complainant.” Id. Some courts require that the defendant’s threat amount 
to doing something unlawful (for example, threatening to kill the victim unless she pays or taking money 
not owed by the victim). See, e.g., United States v. Vigil, 478 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1305 (D.N.M. 2007) (“The 
Court concludes that the term ‘wrongful’ applies when a defendant attempts to extort property to which 
he has no lawful claim—irrespective of the extortion method employed.”). And many scholars argue for 
this standard. See Stuart P. Green, Theft by Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining, 44 
WASHBURN L.J. 553, 556 (2005) (conceding that the federal extortion statute “does not explicitly require 
that the defendant threaten to do an ‘unlawful’ act” but arguing that the term “wrongfulness” in the 
statute should be interpreted to mean “unlawfulness”). To the extent case law interprets extortion 
statutes to require such a showing of unlawfulness, state lawmakers need to amend those statutes to make 
it clear that even threats to do something lawful amount to extortion if done to induce fear in the victim 
in order to coerce a payment from the victim. See generally Ken Levy, The Solution to the Real Blackmail 
Paradox: The Common Link Between Blackmail and Other Criminal Threats, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 
1065 (2007) (stating that laws prohibiting extortive threats exist to protect individuals from “undue fear 
and anxiety”). 
 198.  Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d at 396. Courts have consistently held that the law denounces the means 
by which payment is sought. See, e.g., Garcia v. Garcia, 81 F.3d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1996) (California law) 
(holding that it is the “means employed which the law denounces” as extortion even if the defendant was 
motivated to collect a just debt); Rael v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1990) (New Mexico law) 
(upholding defendant’s extortion conviction because that phrase “to wrongfully compel” refers to the 
threats he used to compel action from the victim and not to “the legitimacy of the defendant’s objective”); 
United States v. Zappola, 523 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff’d, 677 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1982) (federal 
law) (analyzing federal extortion statute under the Hobbs Act and holding that where the threats used 
to obtain the money are “explicitly and unequivocally proscribed by the relevant statutes,” the defendant 
cannot escape conviction because he believed in the validity of the debt owed by the victim); Moore v. 
Newell, 401 F. Supp. 1018, 1020–21 (E.D. Tenn. 1975), aff’d, 548 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding 
extortion conviction for making non-violent threats and stating that the “statute concerns the method by 
which a payment is sought”) Commonwealth v. Cohen, 921 N.E.2d 906, 932 n.46 (Mass. 2010) 
(Massachusetts law) (holding that a threat made to enforce payment of a “just debt” is still extortion). 
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IV 
CRIMINALIZATION TACTICS CIRCUMVENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROHIBITIONS ON INCARCERATION FOR CIVIL DEBTS AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAWS 
Creditors that employ consumer debt criminalization practices are not just 
committing extortion, they are also violating state constitutions that prohibit 
incarcerating individuals for failure to pay civil debts.199 In addition, some states 
have laws that specifically prohibit creditors from threatening to have consumers 
arrested.200 Thus, if prosecutors let creditors get away with extorting consumers 
by using criminalization tactics, prosecutors will, in essence, allow creditors to 
violate consumers’ constitutional and statutory rights to live free from the terror 
of being arrested over civil debts. 
A. Most State Constitutions In Theory Protect Consumers From 
Criminalization 
Most states have constitutional provisions that ban incarceration of 
individuals for civil debts or severely limit the instances in which incarceration is 
permitted.201 Once again, Wakita Shaw’s case provides a poignant illustration of 
how creditors can evade a state’s constitutional protection of its citizens. Ms. 
Shaw is resident of Missouri, which has the following constitutional provision: 
“no person shall be imprisoned for debt, except for nonpayment of fines and 
penalties imposed by law.”202 Missouri case law holds that this constitutional ban 
 
 199.  See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 16 (“No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action, 
or mesnse or final process, unless in cases of fraud.”); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“A person may not be 
imprisoned in a civil action for debt or tort, or in peacetime for a militia fine.”); OHIO CONST., art. 1, § 
15 (same as Arkansas’ constitution). 
 200.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.10(e) (California law prohibits a “threat to any person that 
nonpayment of the consumer debt may result in the arrest of the debtor or the seizure, garnishment, 
attachment or sale of any property . . . , unless such action is in fact contemplated by the debt collector 
and permitted by law.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.7103(1)(e) (prohibiting the making of a “false threat 
that nonpayment of a debt may result in the arrest of a person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment 
or sale of property or wages of that person”); TEX. FIN. CODE § 392.301(a)(5) (Under Texas law, “debt 
collector[s] may not use threats, coercion, or attempts to coerce” that involve “threatening that the debtor 
will be arrested for nonpayment of a consumer debt without proper court proceedings.”); WASH. 
REVISED CODE ANN. § 19.16.250(13) (banning several collection practices, including attempting to 
collect from the debtor by using “threats of force or violence,” and “threats of criminal prosecution”). 
These state law prohibitions are similar to the federal prohibition under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4) (2006) (prohibiting debt collectors from making “[t]he 
representation or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment of 
any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages of any person unless 
such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action”). 
 201.  For a comprehensive list of states that either ban or limit incarceration of individuals over civil 
debts, see Christopher Hampson, Appendix, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1024 (2016), http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ 
vol129_Note1024Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/LXC6-SD5X] (identifying and quoting text from forty-
one state constitutions that ban or substantially limit incarceration). 
 202.  MO. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
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on imprisonment applies to contractual debts; that is, money due directly under 
a contract, as well as to judgment debts arising from litigation over unpaid 
contractual debts.203 
In a case involving a debtor’s default on a promissory note given in exchange 
for money lent, the Missouri Court of Appeals made it clear that the debt came 
within the purview of the constitutional prohibition.204 In Estate of Downs, the 
creditor’s estate sued and obtained a judgment against the debtor.205 After the 
estate’s attempt to garnish the debtor’s assets yielded nothing, the estate moved 
the probate court for a civil contempt order against the debtor for failure to pay 
the judgment debt.206 The estate argued that the debtor was in contempt for 
failing to pay a specific fund of money,207 and the contempt order was, therefore, 
permissible under the constitution. This argument was implausible because the 
estate had already tried unsuccessfully to reach that specific fund in a prior 
garnishment proceeding.208 The Missouri Court of Appeals saw the estate’s use 
of civil contempt for what it really was—an attempt to get around the constitution 
and case law holding that the constitutional ban applies to attempts to collect 
debts arising from litigation over unpaid contractual debts.209 Because the estate 
knew that the debtor was no longer in possession of the specific funds, the civil 
contempt order and subsequent body attachment resulting in the debtor’s 
imprisonment violated the Missouri constitution.210 
Like the creditor in Estate of Downs, the payday lender can raise a similar 
technical distinction—Ms. Shaw was arrested for failing to appear, not for failing 
to pay.  The reality, however, is that the lender had no reason to believe Ms. Shaw 
had money or assets that could be used to pay the debt but simply refused to 
appear for the oral examination. The lender used the civil contempt process to 
force a payment, not a court appearance. Moreover, the data demonstrates that 
payday lenders and other high-cost lenders profit from extending credit to 
consumers who have no money to meet their financial obligations, which is why 
 
 203.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Downs, 300 S.W.3d 242 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 204.  See, e.g., id. 
 205.  Id. at 244. 
 206.  Id. 245. 
 207.  See id. at 248.  
 208.  Id. The fund could not be reached because it was no longer in the possession or control of the 
debtor. Id. 
 209.  Missouri case law holds that it is permissible under the state constitution to order the judgment 
debtor to turnover a specific fund containing money. Id.  
 210.  The court stated in relevant part: 
[I]t is undisputed that [the debtor] cannot return those specific funds because he no longer has 
that fund in his possession . . . Thus, the trial court’s order held [the debtor] in contempt for 
failing to repay money from his own resources to satisfy an obligation that arose from a 
consensual transaction between a creditor and a debtor. This is the definition of a debt for the 
purposes of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debts. The trial court’s order 
imprisoning [the debtor] for failing to repay the promissory note violates Missouri’s 
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debts. 
Id. at 248. 
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they come to these high-cost lenders in the first place.211 Therefore, high-cost 
lenders should not be able evade constitutional protections by misusing civil 
contempt or filing police reports212 to initiate the arrest of consumers who are 
unable to pay civil debts.213 
B. Creditors Are Evading Consumer Protection Laws That Ban Criminalization 
Of Consumers Who Cannot Pay 
Besides skirting state constitutions, creditors that use criminalization tactics 
are also evading state consumer protection laws.214 The federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) bans threats of criminal prosecution to collect 
 
 211.  See supra notes 139–144 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the payday lender knew, or 
should have known, as a business licensed to operate in Missouri, that the payday loan statute banned 
the bad-check prosecution of consumers, like Ms. Shaw, who are unable to pay a loan where a post-dated 
check was used to obtain it. See VERNON’S ANN. MO. STATUTES § 408.505(8) (“A person does not 
commit the crime of passing a bad check pursuant to section 570.120 if at the time the payee accepts a 
check or similar sight order for the payment of money, he or she does so with the understanding that the 
payee will not present it for payment until later and the payee knows or has reason to believe that there 
are insufficient funds on deposit with the drawee at the time of acceptance.”); ERIC ZIEGENHORN, 7 
MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES, LEGAL FORMS § 33:30 (3d ed. & 2016 Update) (citing to § 408.505 and 
stating that “[r]eceiving a payday loan on the basis of a check for which sufficient funds are not present 
at the time of writing does not constitute the crime of passing a bad check”). The payday lender was, 
therefore, violating the spirit of this consumer protection provision by having consumers, like Wakita 
Shaw, arrested via civil contempt. Several states, either by statute or case law, protect payday loan 
customers from being prosecuted for passing a bad check.  See, e.g., infra notes 255–262 and 
accompanying text. 
 212.  See supra Part III. 
 213.  Missouri courts have stated that they have the power to punish for contempt “but only if the 
judicial function is integrally threatened,” and that this power “should be used sparingly, wisely, 
temperately and with judicial self-restraint.” Estate of Dothage v. Dothage, 727 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1987) (citing McMilian v. Rennau, 619 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)). “The power should 
be exercised only when necessary to prevent actual, direct obstruction of, or interference with, the 
administration of justice.” Id. Ms. Shaw’s failure to appear did not in any way threaten the Missouri court 
system or its administration of justice. Scholars and attorneys have provided several reasons why 
consumers fail to appear, and a primary reason is that they do not understand the document requiring 
their appearance and do not realize that being arrested is a consequence of failing to appear. See Shepard, 
supra note 148, at 1536. Moreover, they do not want to lose income by being forced to take a vacation 
day or unpaid time off from work. In short, the creditors know that the majority of consumers fail to 
answer a complaint and fail to appear in debt collection cases; creditors exploit that lack of response. See 
supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text. As a result, the civil contempt is being misused by payday 
lenders and others to perpetrate an injustice—the fast-tracking of payments of civil debts from consumers 
who believe they have been charged with a crime—all in violation of the state constitution. 
 214.  Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Counsel in Support of Petitioners, Henson v. Santander 
Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 810 (2017) (No. 16-349), 2017 WL 818308 (describing how the debt 
collection industry has grown from collecting only 3 billion dollars per year in 1977 to collecting 750 
billion annually and explaining how due, in part, to the growth in technology, states are even less effective 
in protecting their residents from unlawful collection activities than they were forty years ago). 
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a debt.215 However, the FDCPA applies only to debt collectors,216 not original 
creditors that collect their own debts.217 That means, for example, Virginia 
Robinson could have sued the repo company, which was acting to collect a debt 
owed to another, for violating the FDCPA, but she could have not sued Fast Auto 
Loans for violating the FDCPA if it had chosen to collect its own debts directly.218 
Many states have consumer protection laws that, unlike the FDCPA, prohibit 
both creditors and debt collectors from engaging in unlawful collection practices, 
including threatening prosecution to collect debts.219 For instance, the West 
Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act states that it applies to any 
company collecting debts.220 Courts have interpreted the act to explicitly apply to 
creditors collecting their own debts.221 In the lawsuit against the FAL defendants 
mentioned in part II.A, the West Virginia Attorney General, relying on state law, 
obtained a settlement of FAL’s numerous alleged violations, including 
threatening the arrests of consumers who fail to pay or relinquish possession of 
their vehicles.222 
 
 215.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Lensch v. Armada Corp., 795 F. Supp. 2d 
1180, 1185 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (holding that state law was preempted by the FDCPA’s prohibition on 
threatening arrest and, thereby, upheld the FDCPA’s purpose “to prevent debt collectors from making 
empty threats as a way to coerce payment from consumers”); Liggins v. May Co., 373 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio 
Ct. Common Pleas 1977). 
 216.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (2016).  
 217.  Id. at § 1692a(6)(A).  
 218.  See supra notes 25–61 and accompanying text (describing actions taken by a repo man to coerce 
Ms. Robinson into relinquishing ownership of her vehicle to Fast Auto Loans, the lender—original 
creditor—that had lent her money and obtained a security interest in her vehicle). Courts have held that 
the FDCPA applies to repo companies and prohibits them, for example, from using non-judicial actions 
to repossesses a consumer’s vehicle when there is no present right to repossess, such as when the 
consumer is not in default. See, e.g., Buzzell v. Citizens Auto. Fin., Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 
2011); Alexander v. Blackhawk Recovery and Investigation, L.L.C., 731 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. Mich. 
2010). 
 219.  See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 220.  See W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-122(d) (2013). 
 221.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 266 S.E.2d 905, 909 (W. Va. 1980) (“[T]he 
plain meaning of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-122 requires that the provisions of article 2 of Chapter 46A 
regulating improper debt collection practices in consumer credit sales must be applied alike to all who 
engage in debt collection, be they professional debt collectors or creditors collecting their own debts.”). 
Most courts interpreting state statutes that address unlawful debt collection practices have held that these 
statutes are applicable to both debt collection companies and original creditors. See 2 CONSUMER LAW 
SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 675 (2016).  See, e.g., Liggins v. May Co., 373 N.E.2d 
404, 406 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1977) (holding that Ohio’s Consumer Sales Practices Act applies to 
both creditors and debt collection companies attempting to collect consumer debts); State ex rel. Fisher 
v. Lasson, No. CV 92 10 0193, 1994 WL 912252 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1994) (consent entry) (although 
defendants, the original creditors, did not admit to specific violations in a court-approved consent decree, 
the court made several conclusions of law, including that defendants committed unconscionable practices 
in violation of state law, when they threated consumers with jail time for failing to pay membership fees). 
 222.  WV’s Second Amended Complaint, supra note 36, at 11. See also W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-124(b) 
(making an unlawful debt collection practice “[t]he accusation or threat to accuse any person of fraud, 
any crime, or any conduct which, if true, would tend to disgrace such other person or in any way subject 
him to ridicule, or any conduct which, if true, would tend to disgrace such other person or in any way 
subject him to ridicule or contempt of society”). 
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While West Virginia’s residents benefitted from a favorable settlement 
obtained against the FAL defendants, many consumers reside in states where 
consumer protection laws do not apply to creditors collecting their own debts. As 
a result, creditors that criminalize consumers in those stages regularly avoid 
liability. 
Recent FTC and CFPB reports on debt collection practices make it clear that 
the practice of threatening consumers with arrest is a nation-wide problem.223 
Companies that occasionally get caught may pay a fine, but that is not enough to 
deter criminalization practices. The occasional imposition of fines is simply 
factored into the company’s operating cost under a profitable business practice. 
Federal and state enforcement actions demonstrate that creditors and debt 
collection companies are so successful in their criminalization practices that they 
frequently get consumers to pay phantom debts and other debts that are no 
longer lawful to collect.224 
In summary, creditors should not be able to circumvent consumer protection 
laws and state constitutions via criminalization tactics. When creditors evade 
consumer protection laws and state constitutions, they make a mockery of each 
state’s citizens, who, through the democratic process, have decided that 
individuals should not live in fear of imprisonment or be incarcerated for failing 
to pay civil debts.225 
V 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM CRIMINALIZATION 
PRACTICES 
Lawmakers should enact legislation to deter criminalization practices because 
they inflict substantial harm on consumers and their families, the judicial system, 
 
 223.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 14, at 18 
(reporting that among complaints by debt collectors to take illegal action, most of them are threats to “to 
arrest or jail consumers if they do not pay”). In addition to the high-cost lenders discussed in this article, 
creditors that issue traditional forms of consumer credit have been sued for allegedly collecting phantom 
debts. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB 
ANNUAL REPORT 2016 (2016), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201603_cfpb-fair-debt-collection-
practices-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/ EK8Q-ZVRP] (discussing Chase’s $90 million settlement of an 
enforcement action filed by the CFPB alleging that Chase sold to debt buyers credit card accounts that 
included phantom debts, along with debts that were overstated or time-barred by the statute of 
limitations). 
 224.  CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 223. Consumers often succumb to abusive debt 
collection tactics by paying zombie debts, which are debts that are not legitimately owed, but have been 
transferred from the original creditor to a debt collector or debt buyer. See, e.g., Neil L. Sobol, Protecting 
Consumers from Zombie-Debt Collectors, 44 N.M.L. REV. 327, 327–28 (2014) (stating that zombie debt 
may not be lawfully owed for several reasons, including that it has already been paid to the original 
creditor, it has expired under the statute of limitations, or it has been discharged in a consumer’s 
bankruptcy case).  
 225.  Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Constitutional Status of Unconstitutional Speech, 
48 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (1995) (“[C]onstitutional theory presumes that citizens in a well-functioning 
constitutional democracy will upon reflection affirm fundamental constitutional values”). 
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and society at large.226 A summary of the harm is followed by a discussion of 
plausible solutions. 
Consumers subjected to criminalization tactics suffer financial, emotional, 
physical, and reputational harm.227 Consumers who are only threatened with 
arrest are at least emotionally harmed because, living in terror, they are robbed 
of their peace of mind and sometimes become physically ill.228 Consumers who 
comply with the creditor’s demands are financially harmed when they relinquish 
ownership of personal property, pay unlawful fees and interests, or, tragically, 
pay phantom debts.229 Payday loan customers, credit card holders, student loan 
 
 226.  See, e.g., supra note 121 and accompanying text (Wakita Shaw’s mother borrowed money to get 
her out of jail, and then Ms. Shaw herself eventually filed bankruptcy); Johnson, supra note 7, at 11–12 
(After getting arrested, Laquetta Hall borrowed money from someone else to pay off debt owed to a 
RTO company).  
 227.  See, e.g., supra notes 70–106 and accompanying text (describing the criminalization tactics 
perpetrated by a RTO company against Janellen Edwards, who suffered financial harm by having to give 
up her furniture and extreme emotional distress after enduring repeated threatening phone calls from 
RTO dealer’s employees who showed up at her home more than once). Patricia Haase lost ownership of 
her vehicle after a car title lender used the police to unlawfully repossess her vehicle. See Johnson, supra 
note 7, at 47–54 (describing how the car title lender’s criminalization tactics amounted to financial abuse 
and stating that the lender was ordered to pay compensatory and punitive damages for its unlawful 
collection and repossession practices against Ms. Haase). Additionally, Christina McHan, after her 
payday lender filed a police report against her, was arrested and spent the night in jail. See, e.g., Wilder, 
supra note 2. Virginia Robinson was financially harmed when the FAL never gave her surplus funds in 
excess of the debt owed after repossessing and selling her car. See WV’s Complaint, supra note 20, Exh. 
J. at 2. She suffered reputational and emotional harm as well when collectors came to her workplace and 
spoke about her indebtedness with her coworkers. Id.  
 228.  See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 
70, at ¶ 20, (“Plaintiff [Janellen Edwards] suffered severe emotional distress as a result of the ongoing 
pattern of threats, intimidation and humiliation she endured as a result of TRS’s conduct. She 
experienced migraine headaches, nausea, elevated heart rate, difficulty breathing, stabbing pains in her 
chest around her heart, loss of appetite, difficulty sleeping, upset stomach, severe anxiety, depression, 
and apprehension. She was humiliated by TRS’s contacts with her co-workers, family, and associates.”); 
Forrest Wilder, Report: Texas Payday Lenders and Prosecutors Team Up to Criminally Pursue 
Borrowers, TEX. OBSERVER (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.texasobserver.org/report-texas-payday-
lenders-prosecutors-team-criminally-pursue-borrowers/ [https://perma.cc/V72L-MM8B] (After finding 
out a payday lender had filed a bad-check complaint against her, Margaret Jones, a seventy-one-year-
old, whose income was from monthly social security checks, said: “I was just terrified to the point that I 
couldn’t eat, my blood pressure went up . . . I was just nervous, scared.”). 
 229.  See, e.g., CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2016, supra note 223 (reporting about several federal 
enforcement actions filed against companies engaged in unlawful debt collection practices, including 
coercing consumers into paying phantom debts); Johnson, supra note 7, at 28 (discussing an FTC lawsuit 
against a company that added unlawful fees, including up to $200 in bogus legal fees, to payday loan debts 
and intimidated consumers into paying these grossly inflated debts by using threats of arrest); Cash 
Advance Group - Payday Loan Debt Collection Scam, WA DEP’T FIN. INSTITUTIONS (Feb. 14, 2017), 
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/consumer/alerts/cash-advance-group-payday-loan-debt-collection-scam  [https:// 
perma.cc/FB9G-ADR2] (warning from the Washington State Department of Financial Institutions about 
a group of entities operating a payday lending debt scam where some consumers fell prey to threats of 
arrests contained in fake arrest warrants attached to email messages sent to the consumers).  
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borrowers,230 RTO customers,231 and car title borrowers have all been arrested as 
a result of actions initiated by creditors and have suffered immediate 
consequences, such as loss of employment.232 
Besides the harm to individual consumers, taxpayer dollars subsidize the 
misappropriation of resources when law enforcement and prosecutors act as debt 
collectors and repo men for creditors.233 Janellen Edwards’ prosecution ordeal, 
which transpired over several months, demonstrates this waste of law 
enforcement and judicial resources as result of TRS Home Furnishings’ 
criminalization tactics.234 Moreover, creditors are shifting the costs of their 
 
 230.  See, e.g., Abby Jackson, 7 Deputy US Marshals Reportedly Arrested a Guy Over a $1,500 Student 
Loan He Took Out 29 Years Ago, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/can-
you-get-arrested-for-having-student-loan-debt-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/4DPQ-B9AR]. 
 231.  See, e.g., David Rosen, 5 Scams and Rackets That Can Turn You Into a 21st-Century Indentured 
Servant, ALTERNET (July 2, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/economy/americas-modern-debtors-prison 
[https://perma.cc/B7J8-D7AJ] (identifying a RTO customer in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, who was 
arrested for “felony theft by deception, felony theft of leased property and felony receiving stolen 
property” after defaulting on payments for furniture and electronics obtained from a local Rent-A-
Center store).  
 232.  See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 3 (stating that Antonio Walker was fired after he was arrested over 
criminal charges stemming from debt involving RTO furniture even the charges were later dropped). 
Because employers, landlords, and other organization (both public and private) obtain full background 
checks on individual applicants for various reasons, arrest records routinely appear in databases even 
when individuals are never charged with or convicted of a crime. See Johnson, supra note 7, at 71 n.334. 
Such records are sometimes used to deny individuals employment, housing, licensing, and other services. 
Id. Because the criminalization tactics discussed in this article can lead to unlawful arrests that appear in 
background check databases, state lawmakers have another reason to pass laws penalizing creditors who 
engage in such tactics. 
 233.  For example, instead of police officers going to Ms. Edwards’ workplace to give her a citation 
over a dispute about the furniture, these limited law enforcement resources would have been better 
utilized investigating crimes, such as drug dealing and human trafficking, not acting as repo men for RTO 
companies. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, 
at ¶ 18 (stating that a “TRS employee contacted the police, and caused a police officer to come to 
plaintiff’s workplace”); See also supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text (explaining why TRS was 
found civilly liable for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress).  Similarly, 
judges and prosecutors, who are already burdened with heavy criminal case loads, should be devoting 
taxpayer-funded resources to seeking justice for victims of actual crimes, not serving as debt collectors 
for RTO companies and payday lenders. 
 234.  From the moment TRS employees filed a police report, which an officer later testified was based 
on false information supplied by TRS employees, law enforcement and judicial resources began to be 
wasted. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 70, at 
¶ 2. Ms. Edwards repeatedly appeared in court due to TRS’s false allegations. Throughout this entire 
process, the judge had to oversee the hearings, the bailiff had to be present, and other members of the 
court, such as the stenographer, had to use resources to record the hearings that were based on lies about 
Ms. Edwards. Much time was taken to depose Ms. Edwards, TRS employees, and others. Additionally, 
Ms. Edwards testified that she eventually quit her job in real estate due to the events that occurred with 
TRS. Id. at 15–16. Due to the help of a criminal law attorney, the charges against her were dropped. 
However, the use of judicial resources did not end because she, rightly so, filed a civil lawsuit against TRS 
for its numerous violations of consumer protection laws. Two years later, Ms. Edwards won her civil case, 
which proved that TRS not only violated consumer protection laws, but also set in motion an ordeal that 
was a waste of both law enforcement and judicial resources. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for JNOV and for New Trial, supra note 84, at 1 (stating “at the conclusion of the four day 
jury trial, plaintiff Janellen Edwards prevailed on all of her claims for relief”). All these resources were 
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improvident lending practices onto private citizens who use their money to bail 
consumers out of jail, and non-profit organizations that are compelled to aid 
consumers victimized by criminalization tactics.235 If consumers cannot borrow 
money from their relatives or friends, they are sometimes forced to use exempt 
income sources to pay off debts and seek out government-sponsored programs, 
such as food stamps, and non-profit organizations to help them survive.236  
It is time for the United States to take serious steps to protect consumers from 
criminalization tactics. Along with urging that creditors be prosecuted for 
committing extortion, this article proposes several additional solutions, the first 
of which is to limit the use of civil contempt. 
A. Bright Line Test To Limit Misuse Of Civil Contempt 
Statutes that permit arrest warrants in civil contempt cases should be 
amended to limit when a creditor can even request a hearing to discover assets. 
This proposed amendment would then make it very unlikely that the creditor 
would be able to obtain an arrest warrant against a person sued for defaulting on 
a consumer loan. 
Consider Illinois’s recent attempt to limit when an arrest warrant can be 
issued. Even though the Illinois constitution generally bans incarceration of 
individuals over civil debts,237 creditors had been accused of regularly abusing the 
civil contempt process to have consumers arrested in violation of the 
constitution.238 In July of 2012, Governor Pat Quinn signed into law a bill, 
referred to as the Debtors’ Rights Act.239 It requires, among other things, the 
creditor to personally serve the individual debtor with a Citation to Discover 
Assets along with an “Income and Asset Form.”240 According to a press release 
 
wasted simply because a rent-to-own company wanted to quickly get paid in full rather than file a civil 
lawsuit and take the long and lawful route to collect a civil debt. 
 235.  See, e.g., supra note 121 (discussing Wakita Shaw, who stayed in jail until her mother could find 
someone to borrow from in order to pay the full bail amount to obtain Ms. Shaw’s freedom). 
 236. See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 148, at 1536 (explaining why consumers may use exempted income 
sources to post bail to be released from jail); BRIAN T. MELZER ET AL., SPILLOVERS FROM COSTLY 
CREDIT 4 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. for Econ. Studies No. CES-WP-11, 2013), http://www.kellogg. 
northwestern.edu/faculty/melzer/Papers/Spillovers_from_Costly_Credit_04_11_2013.pdf (finding that 
families living in areas that have local access to payday loans were 20% more likely to use food stamps 
and confirming “that the effect of payday lending on food stamp receipt grows through time, as does 
payday loan availability”). See generally ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., HOUSEHOLD FOOD 
SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2014 4–8 (2015), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1896841/ 
err194.pdf (reporting statistical data about the frequency of use of food pantries and soup kitchens by 
families experiencing food insecurity). 
 237.  See ILL. CONST. art. I, § 14 (“No person shall be imprisoned for debt unless he refuses to deliver 
up his estate for the benefit of his creditors as provided by law or unless there is a strong presumption of 
fraud.”). 
 238.  See Greco & Hammer, supra note 131. 
 239.  See Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan: New Laws Ban Sending Debtors to 
Prison for Debts, Protect Consumers from High Costs of Refund Anticipation Loans (July 25, 2012), 
http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2012_07/20120725.html [https://perma.cc/U7S9-S92W]. 
 240.  See Public Act 97-0848; 735 ILCS 5/2–1402(a) (2014).  
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issued upon its passage, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan proclaimed that 
it was time to end the “illegal abuses” of the judicial system by creditors who 
manipulate the court system to “extract money from the unemployed” and from 
those too poor to pay their debts.241 
Unfortunately, the act does not afford consumer debtors any free legal 
representation and takes for granted that consumers will understand the required 
notices and be able to complete the Income and Asset Form in a timely manner 
to prove which assets and income sources are exempt from attachment.242 The 
Illinois law will most likely result in the arrest of consumers who fail to comply 
with all the law’s provisions, including the timely submission of the required 
form.243 Moreover, even if an arrest warrant is not issued, the entire discovery 
process will waste judicial resources in cases involving high-cost lenders, such as 
the ones described in this article. 
Rather than putting the burden on consumers to comprehend legal 
documents and respond in a timely manner, lawmakers should implement a 
bright-line rule based on the loan’s initial APR and the consumer debtor’s 
income. If the creditor or debt collector is seeking to collect on a credit 
transaction with an effective APR at the time of origination of more than thirty-
six percent, the creditor or debt collector should be denied any request for a 
hearing to discover assets unless it first demonstrates (from the consumer’s credit 
application or pay stub) that the consumer is an above-median-income debtor for 
his or her family size.244 This bright-line test would also include loan contracts 
 
 241.  Greco & Hammer, supra note 131. Ms. Madigan stated that “the new law codifies and clarifies 
practices followed by attorneys, creditors and courts across Illinois to ensure that courts make a finding 
of a consumer’s ability to pay before entering a payment order, and it prohibits payment orders that rely 
on legally protected income and prevents arrest warrants from being issued unless the debtor was 
personally served with a hearing notice.” See Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan, supra note 239. 
 242.  Greco & Hammer, supra note 131, at 136 (explaining that “the new legislation does not create 
any additional statutory exemptions; rather, it merely serves to highlight debtors’ rights to assert 
exemptions that have existed for years”).  
 243.  Although I represented creditors during most of my private practice experience, I had the 
fortune to represent consumer debtors at Neighborhood Legal Services Association in Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. Based on my experience, I do not believe the majority of consumer–debtors would be able 
to determine on their own all that is required under Illinois’ amended law to avoid civil contempt. 
Moreover, it is well-documented that the majority of consumers who qualify for legal aid representation 
are unable to actually receive pro bono service. KUEHNHOFF & CHING, supra note 135, at 1 (“Nationally, 
because of lack of resources, legal aid programs must turn away more than half of the eligible people who 
seek their assistance.”). As a result, it is fundamentally unfair to leave consumers who are likely to be in 
financial trouble to fend for themselves against highly experienced lawyers that represent creditors.  
 244.  The author’s idea for relying on the debtor’s median income came from the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, enacted in 2005. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA]. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A) 
(2006). For an overview of the means test, see U.S. Dept. of Justice, Means Testing, DOJ (Apr. 14, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/ust/means-testing [https://perma.cc/DU3A-TTMV] (the heart of BAPCPA is the 
means test, which is set forth in § 707(b)). See 151 Cong. Rec. S1726-01, S1779 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2005) 
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). Instead of the pre-BAPCPA case-by-case analysis of a debtor’s ability 
to pay, Congress adopted the means test as a uniform mechanically-applied formula and intended that 
most above-median income debtors be required to file for Chapter 13 relief, not Chapter 7, and pay back 
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that have a default interest rate of thirty-six percent or higher, or a contract that 
allows the creditor to charge both a default interest rate and late charges. These 
contract terms would allow creditors to essentially get away with charging 
already-struggling consumers double the original loan principal.245 
The justification for a bright-line test is based on documented financial data 
about consumers who rely on high-cost credit. Payday lenders, car title lenders, 
RTO dealers, and some installment lenders issue credit with effective APRs 
amounting to triple-digit, and sometimes quadruple-digit, interest rates.246 Plus 
their business models are founded on lending to consumers with no savings, lower 
incomes, and less assets.247 Therefore, it is fair to put the burden on creditors to 
prove a consumer debtor has above-median income before it can even request a 
hearing to discover assets.  
  
 
some of their unsecured debts via a Chapter 13 plan. See Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. 
White, Catching Can–Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 
677–83 (2005). See also Wieland v. Thomas, 382 B.R. 793, 796, 798 (D. Kan. 2008) (The purpose of 
BAPCPA was to “ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can afford,” and “[t]hat purpose 
is best achieved by applying the means test in such a manner that the debtor’s actual financial 
circumstances—i.e., what the debtor can actually afford to repay creditors—are represented”). The 
starting point of this uniform mechanically-applied formula is to first determine whether the debtor has 
an above-median income for his or her household size in the state where the household resides. See 11 
U.S.C. § 707(b)(7)(A); In re Briscoe, 374 B.R. 1, 10 (Bankr. D.C. 2007) (“A presumption of abuse under 
the means test of § 707(b)(2) can only arise if the debtor is an above-median income debtor.”). Because 
Congress has already adopted the means test, which presumes the ability of above-median-income 
debtors to be capable of paying back the minimum amount of debt, the author’s proposal of a bright-line 
test is reasonable in that it would require a high-cost lender or debt collector to prove the consumer 
debtor has above-median income before seeking discovery against the consumer debtor.  
 245.  Advocates and scholars have already determined that these and similar contract terms are 
predatory and need to be banned or curtailed. See, e.g., Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending 
Prevention Project: Prescribing a Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. 
L.J. 1, 30–31 (2000) (explaining that “once a loan has been identified as a high-cost loan, the following 
limitations and prohibitions apply: a) the lender may not unilaterally accelerate the indebtedness, except 
upon default of the borrower; b) the loan may not contain any payment that is more than double the 
regular monthly payment, thus effectively preventing balloon payments; c) the loan may not provide for 
negative amortization; d) the interest rate may not be increased following default; e) the lender cannot 
require more than two payments to be paid in advance; f) no loan may be consummated unless the 
borrower receives approved housing counseling; g) no loan may be extended unless the lender 
‘reasonably’ believes that the borrower will be able to repay the loan; h) financing of fees or charges 
payable to third parties is prohibited; i) a lender may not charge fees in connection with the refinancing 
of prior loans with the borrower; and j) payments to home improvement contractors must be jointly 
payable to the borrower or payable to a third-party escrow agent”). I am not arguing for a ban on default 
interest rates but that high-cost lenders with such terms should not be able to request oral hearings to 
discover assets unless they have independent evidence that the consumer has above-median income to 
justify invoking this post-judgment remedy.  
 246.  See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. B & B Investment Group, Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 670 (N.M. 2014) 
(holding that defendants’ so-called “signature loans” marketed in the State of New Mexico were 
unconscionable and holding that it “is grossly unreasonable and against public policy to offer installment 
loans at 1,147.14 to 1,500 percent interest [rates]”). See also supra notes 135–138 and accompanying text.  
 247.  See also supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text (stating also that the consumer’s income is 
likely from a protected income source (for example, child support payments)). 
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Because creditors usually obtain proof of income (for example, copies of pay 
stubs) prior to credit approval,248 it would be easy for a creditor to determine 
whether a consumer debtor’s household income is above the median. 249 Once the 
creditor proves that the income is above the median, the court would then have 
concrete financial information that may indicate the debtor has the ability to pay.  
At that point, the creditor would be able to request that the debtor complete an 
asset/income form like the one required in Illinois. If that form indicates that the 
debtor has non-exempt income sources or unencumbered, non-exempt personal 
property, only then should the creditor be allowed to request a hearing for oral 
examination. Imposing these restrictions on creditors would prevent them from 
being able to abuse the civil contempt process as a pretext for getting arrest 
warrants and thereby limit their ability to waste judicial resources in cases 
involving exorbitantly priced consumer credit. 
B. States Should Ban Payday Lenders From Attempting To Have Their 
Customers Arrested 
Although the above proposed limitations on the use of civil contempt would 
apply to all high-cost lenders, payday lenders need additional restrictions placed 
on them to deter criminalization practices. The payday lending industry is rife 
with regulation-evading companies; therefore, payday lenders should be 
completely banned from seeking civil contempt orders against consumers or 
having them criminally prosecuted. Furthermore, if caught doing so, payday 
lenders should be held liable for actual and punitive damages. The proposed ban 
and monetary liability would apply to any company or debt buyer attempting to 
collect a payday loan debt. 
  
 
 248.  See, e.g., In re Marquardt, 561 B.R. 715, 726 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2016) (holding that the consumer’s 
payday loan debt would be discharged in his bankruptcy case, the court noted that because payday 
lenders, including Americash, “charge interest rates upwards of 400%,” and “make these loans based on 
little more than proof of income,” they “are almost never justified in relying on a debtor’s assurances of 
repayment”); Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1, 9 (2002) (explaining the payday loan process, which includes the customer providing proof of income); 
Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic 
Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41, 62 (2012) (describing the results of a study of car title 
lenders in New Mexico and stating that most lenders require proof of an income source); Press Release, 
Rent-A-Center, New Campaign Promotes Credit-Free Alternatives (Nov. 24, 2008), http:// 
media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/90/90764/Rent-A-Center%20Press%20Release.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/DG2U-GXHX] (claiming to be free of credit checks, Rent-A-Center nevertheless requires that 
applicants offer proof of an income source). 
 249.  Because the means test under BAPCPA requires a determination that the debtor’s income is 
above the median income for his or her household size, see supra note 244 for further discussion, median 
income figures are readily available for a creditor to review. See 1 THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND 
CREDITORS § 10:13 (2016) (“The median family income numbers are taken from U.S. Census Bureau 
tables for each state, based upon the number of persons in the household. The Census Bureau regularly 
updates its tables, with an adjustment for cost of living increase based on the Consumer Price Index, and 
those tables for a current year are found at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/bapcpa.”). 
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Payday lenders should be singled out for several reasons. First, several states 
have passed laws in the last decade to curb payday loan borrowing.250 However, 
the payday loan industry has largely remained unaffected by these laws because 
of its ability to exploit loopholes.251 In Ohio, for example, payday lenders have 
found a way to skirt an APR cap of twenty-eight percent and now charge interest 
rates higher than the triple-digit interest rates allowed under a pre-2008 law.252 
Although the industry’s trade association has taken the position that its 
members should not threaten or initiate criminal prosecution,253 this positon 
appears to be mere window dressing, especially in light of the fact that state and  
  
 
 250. Despite states being characterized as either red or blue, the trend in the United States is for 
voters and lawmakers to favor limiting payday lending.  For example, on the same day that the majority 
of South Dakota residents voted to elect Donald Trump as president, an even larger percentage of voters 
approved a law capping interest rates on payday and car title loans at 36%.  See Ashlee Kieler, South 
Dakotans Vote To Cap Payday, Auto-Title Loan Interest Rates At 36%, Consumerist, CONSUMERIST 
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/11/09/ south-dakotans-vote-to-cap-payday-auto-title-loan-
interest-rates-at-36/ [https://perma.cc/4VT6-GXMB] (stating that seventy-six percent voted for a ballot 
initiative capping interest rates).  See also Timothy Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Interest Rate Caps, 
State Legislation, and Public Opinion: Does The Law Reflect The Public’s Desires?, 89 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 115, 116–18 (2014) (discussing ballot initiatives in several states and stating that interest-rate caps 
on payday loans were approved by voters in the red states of Arizona and Montana).    
 251.  See, e.g., James v. National Financial, LLC, 132 A.3d 799, 834 (Del. Ch. 2016) (holding that 
defendant’s extremely high-cost loan was unconscionable and stating that “the most critical aspect of the 
bargaining environment was the purpose and effect of the Loan Agreement, which was to evade 
[Delaware’s] Payday Loan Law”).  
 252.  In 2008, voters in Ohio overwhelmingly voted to ratify a state law reducing the then legalized 
interest rates on payday loans from 391% to 28%. See, e.g., Payday Lenders Need a Firm Federal Hand 
and State Oversight, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Sept. 2, 2016), 2016 WLNR 26826317. Payday lenders, 
however, simply exploited a never-before-used law to charge consumers interest rates as high as 718%. 
Id.; Creola Johnson, America’s First Consumer Financial Watchdog Is on a Leash: Can the CFPB Use Its 
Authority to Declare Payday-Loan Practices Unfair, Abusive, and Deceptive?, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 381, 
396–27 (2012) (describing how payday lenders in several states, including Ohio, circumvent key 
provisions of newly enacted state laws and proposing that the CFPB ban certain payday-loan terms, 
including balloon payments and short maturity dates). In addition to evading state laws, payday lenders 
have been sanctioned for violating federal bankruptcy law by, among other things, violating the 
automatic stay, which is a temporary injunction that bars creditors from contacting debtors directly to 
get them to pay pre-bankruptcy debts. See, e.g., In re Snowden, 769 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2014) (upholding 
the bankruptcy court’s imposition of punitive damages on a payday lender for willfully violating the 
automatic stay by several unlawful practices, including repeatedly calling the medical facility where the 
consumer debtor worked as nurse to get her to pay a pre-bankruptcy loan). 
 253.  The Community Financial Services Association of America, the national trade association for 
the industry, has created for its members a list of “best practices,” including the practice of members not 
pursuing criminal action against their borrowers. CFSA Member Best Practices, COMMUNITY FIN. 
SERVS. ASSOC. AM., http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-member-best-practices.aspx#sthash.DZx2UiyP.dpu [https:// 
perma.cc/JNK5-6EHE] (last visited Aug. 4, 2016) (including a “No Criminal Action” practice, which 
states that “[a] member will not threaten or pursue criminal action against a customer as a result of the 
customer’s check being returned unpaid or the customer’s account not being paid”). However, it is clear 
that some lenders are not following this best practice. See, e.g., Catherine Dunn, Group Warns of Debtors’ 
Prison Tactics Among Texas Payday Lenders, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014), http://www.ibtimes 
.com/group-warns-debtors-prison-tactics-among-texas-payday-lenders-1763720 (stating that over 1,500 
criminal complaints have been filed by payday lenders in Texas alone). 
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federal enforcement actions prove criminalization practices are rampant among 
payday lenders and their debt-collection agents.254  
In several states that authorize payday lending, a consumer cannot be 
prosecuted, at least in theory, based solely on the fact that the consumer’s post-
dated check was returned (or a debit authorization to the consumer’s account 
was denied) due to insufficient funds.255 This protection was incorporated into 
some payday lending statutes because in the early days of payday lending 
consumers were being prosecuted for passing bad checks despite the fact that the 
payday lenders were not victims of a crime.256 To obtain a conviction for passing 
a bad check, the prosecution needs to show not only that the defendant gave the 
payee a check knowing his or her account had insufficient funds, but that the 
payee also lacked knowledge that the account had insufficient funds.257 Payday 
lenders, as payees on post-dated checks, are not victims of a crime because they 
know at the time a consumer applies for loan approval that the consumer’s 
account lacks sufficient funds.258 Therefore, the lender only has a civil claim for 
breach of contract. No consumer should be prosecuted under those 
circumstances. 
Consider again Wakita Shaw’s case, where the payday lender knew, or should 
have known, as a business licensed to operate in Missouri, that the payday loan 
statute banned the bad-check prosecution of consumers unable to pay loans 
obtained with post-dated checks.259 The payday lender was, however, violating 
the spirit of this consumer protection provision by misusing civil contempt to 
have consumers like Wakita Shaw arrested.  
Similarly, when Cash Biz and other payday lenders in Texas filed criminal 
charges against hundreds of consumers who had defaulted on their loans, the 
lenders knew, or should have known, that the Texas constitution prohibits 
incarceration of individuals over debts, and that a state regulation provides that 
 
 254.  See infra notes 260–263 and accompanying text.  When payday lending started in the late 1990s, 
consumer–borrowers had to give lenders post-dated checks in order to obtain loans. Johnson, Payday 
Loans, supra 248, at 71. If the consumer’s check bounced due to insufficient funds, payday lenders often 
filed criminal complaints that accused consumers of the crime of passing a bad check. Id.  Even though 
many lenders no longer require a physical post-dated check, those that practice criminalization practices 
will nevertheless accuse the customer of passing a bad check if the attempted debit to the customer’s 
account is denied due to insufficient funds. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7. 
 255.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 42–47 (discussing the criminalization tactics of Goldman 
Schwartz, a company that was a debt collector for several payday lenders, including Ace Cash Express, 
the nation’s second largest payday lender).  
 256.  Id. at 16. 
 257.  Id. See, e.g., Turner v. E-Z Check Cashing of Cookeville, Tenn., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051 
(M.D. Tenn. 1999) (“Tennessee law forbids prosecution of a person who issues a check which ‘the payee 
or holder knows or has good and sufficient reason to believe the drawer did not have sufficient funds on 
deposit to the drawer’s credit with the drawee to ensure payment.”). 
 258.  Turner, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (holding that “it is reasonable, logical, and predictable” that the 
payday lender knows the consumer–borrower’s account has insufficient funds to cover the check and, 
therefore, the lender is not the victim of a crime). 
 259.  See VERNON’S ANN. MO. STAT. § 408.505(8); infra notes 260–262 and accompanying text.  
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the lenders should only pursue prosecution when they have specific evidence of 
a consumer committing forgery, fraud, theft, or some other criminal conduct.260 
This imputed knowledge is why the Texas Office of the Consumer Credit 
Commissioner fined Cash Biz261 and issued a bulletin warning all payday lenders 
operating in Texas not to pursue criminal prosecution of consumers unless they 
had specific evidence of forgery or other intentional unlawful conduct proving 
the consumer’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.262   
Even ACE Cash Express, the nation’s second largest payday lender, has been 
sued for alleged criminalization practices. In 2014, ACE agreed to pay $10 million 
to settle with the CFPB a lawsuit alleging numerous violations, including 
allegations that ACE’s own employees and third-party debt collectors repeatedly 
threatened consumers with criminal prosecution.263 Given the industry’s track 
record of ignoring state and federal laws, payday lenders must be completely 
barred from initiating criminal charges of any kind against consumers. 
In addition to completely banning payday lenders from filing police reports 
or criminal complaints, substantial liability should be imposed on lenders that 
attempt to file criminal charges as well as on lenders that only threaten to do so. 
Lenders found to have engaged in a pattern of criminalization practices should 
be required to pay treble damages to each victim and should be subject to 
punitive damages starting at $10,000 for each person victimized.264 Consumers 
 
 260.  TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (“No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.”). The Texas Finance 
Code states: “a person may not threaten or pursue criminal charges against a consumer related to a check 
or other debit authorization provided by the consumer as security for a transaction in the absence of 
forgery, fraud, theft, or other criminal conduct.” TEX. FIN. CODE § 393.201(c)(3) (2012).  See also TEX. 
FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.301(a) (West 2006) (“In debt collection, a debt collector may not use threats, 
coercion or attempts to coerce that employ any of the following practices ... [including] accusing falsely 
or threatening to accuse falsely a person of fraud or any other crime.”). 
 261.  Agreed Order, In Matter of Cash Zone LLC d/b/a Cash Biz, (Dec. 15, 2014) (No. L15-048) 
(imposing a fine of $10,000 and ordering Cash Biz provide restitution to all consumers against whom it 
had filed criminal complaints).  
 262.  TEX. OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM’R, CREDIT ACCESS BUSINESS ADVISORY 
BULLETIN, FILING CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST CONSUMERS, (2013), http://occc.texas.gov/sites/ 
default/files/uploads/disclosures/b13-9-cab-criminal-charges.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT2J-B3A9]. In 
Texas, payday lenders are registered to operate as credit access businesses (CABs). The Bulletin warned 
payday lenders or CABS that a post-dated check or debit authorization alone cannot be the basis for 
prosecution and that lenders should not pursue prosecution of consumers “unless it has specific evidence” 
of forgery, fraud, theft, or other criminal conduct. Id. (“Before threatening or pursuing a criminal charge, 
a CAB should have specific evidence that the state can use to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt—that 
a consumer knowingly violated a criminal law when entering the transaction.”). 
 263.  Consent Order, In the Matter of ACE Cash Express, Inc., No. 2014-CFPB-0008,  2014 WL 
4472891 (July 10, 2014),; Press Release, Consumer Fin. Protection Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against 
ACE Case Express for Pushing Payday Borrowers Into a Cycle of Debt (July 10, 2014), http://www 
.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-ace-cash-express-for-pushing-payd 
ay-borrowers-into-cycle-of-debt/ [https://perma.cc/HA6K-E7LX] (uncovering a diagram in ACE’s 
training manual that the CFPB alleges was used to trap consumers in a cycle of indebtedness). 
 264.  Starting with a punitive damages award at $10,000 seems fair given that consumers in a successful 
litigation can obtain that amount under applicable laws. Several federal and state statutes limit the 
amount of punitive damages in a single lawsuit. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (Equal Credit Opportunity 
Act) (“Any creditor,  . . . who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter shall 
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who prevail against lenders should also be allowed to recover the cost of 
reasonable attorneys’ fees.  
Finally, mandatory arbitration and class-action waiver clauses in payday loan 
contracts should be declared unenforceable by lenders that engage in 
criminalization practices. Cash Biz is the poster child for why these clauses should 
be unenforceable. After a class-action lawsuit was filed against it for numerous 
state law violations, including filing over 400 criminal complaints against its 
customers, Cash Biz invoked its contractual arbitration clauses and class-action 
waiver provisions to avoid being held civilly liable on a large scale.265 A payday 
lender’s duplicitous conduct—using the criminal justice system to accuse its 
customers of crimes and then fighting to keep those same customers out of civil 
court—should be disallowed to deter the lender from using criminalization 
tactics.  
In light of the industry’s ability to earn billions by ignoring state laws passed 
to end the payday loan debt cycle,266 no reason exists for payday lenders to cease 
using criminalization tactics on their own. In short, the above-proposed measures 
should make the cost of doing wrong increase to the degree that payday lenders 
are motivated to do right by complying with applicable laws. Passage of a multi-
faceted solution is necessary to protect consumers from payday lenders that 
engage in criminalization practices. 
  
 
be liable to the aggrieved applicant for punitive damages in an amount not greater than $10,000, in 
addition to any actual damages provided in subsection (a) of this section, except that in the case of a class 
action the total recovery under this subsection shall not exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of 
the net worth of the creditor.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1787.3 (capping punitive damages at $10,000). 
 265.  Despite the fact that Texas already has a law applicable to payday lenders that severely limits 
when a consumer can be prosecuted for passing a bad check, Cash Biz filed criminal complaints lacking 
any legal grounds for prosecution against hundreds of consumers. See supra notes 260–262 and 
accompanying text. The state regulator imposed on Cash Biz a $10,000 fine and a restitution order.  See 
supra notes 260–262 and accompanying text. With such a small fine, it is reasonable to conclude that Cash 
Biz’s profits exceeded the fine imposed. Why is that so? Because this company had developed a 
reputation for seeking criminal prosecution, some consumers who received only verbal threats from Cash 
Biz would have paid outstanding loans, even in amounts exceeding what they owed. After being sued for 
its criminalization tactics in a class action lawsuit, Cash Biz defended on the basis that the consumers had 
to arbitrate individually due to mandatory arbitration and class-action wavier provisions in their loan 
contracts. See Cash Biz, LP v. Henry, No. 04–15–00469–CV, 2016 WL 4013794, at *1, 8 (Tex. App.–San 
Antonio July 27, 2016).  The majority of the appellate court ruled in Cash Biz’s favor, thereby compelling 
consumers to arbitrate in individual cases. But see id. at 8 (Martinez, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the 
majority and stating that Cash Biz did sufficiently invoke the judicial process, and thereby waived its right 
to arbitration, because “[b]y submitting the sworn complaints, Cash Biz not only procured the 
prosecution, it became a ‘witness’ in the criminal prosecution, i.e., a person who presented personal 
knowledge of the borrowers’ purported criminal conduct”).   
 266.  See, e.g., Policy Brief, Center for Responsible Lending, Payday and Car Title Lenders Drain $8 
Billion in Fees (Jan. 2017), http://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-
publication/crl_statebystate_fee_drain_may2016_0.pdf (providing examples of payday lenders evading 
state laws that cap interest rates on payday loans and explaining how lenders profit primarily from 
consumers trapped in long-term debt, even though payday loans are marketed as short-term loans).  
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C. Statutes That RTO Lenders Use To Have Consumers Arrested Should Be 
Decriminalized 
Along with curbing the criminalization practices of payday lenders, state 
lawmakers must also stop the criminalization practices of RTO companies. The 
RTO industry has, over the years, lobbied for passage of laws expanding the 
definition of theft crimes to include fraudulent leasing of and failing to return 
RTO property.267 These laws criminalize consumers who have defaulted on their 
payments by making typical breach-of-contract behavior a crime.268 When law 
enforcement and prosecutors do not actually understand the required mens rea, 
consumers will be wrongfully arrested, prosecuted, and, sometimes, convicted for 
simply breaching a contract.269 Thus, it is imperative that state lawmakers repeal 
criminal statutes currently exploited by RTO companies to have customers 
arrested. 
Consider, as an example, a bill supported by RTO dealers and debated before 
the Connecticut General Assembly. In 2006, RTO dealers in Connecticut tried 
to expand a state law to criminalize customers who failed to pay their outstanding 
debts.270 The assembly accepted testimony from RTO dealers.271 One dealer, Mr. 
Brett Lagasse, testified that the law was necessary to curb losses to RTO 
businesses and raised the ancillary issue of loss of tax revenue from customers.272 
His testimony further implied that the proposed law would be used against 
customers who have failed to pay for items rented only for commercial use, not 
for personal or household use.273 
 
 267.  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 7, at 57–58 (describing how RTO dealers in Florida lobbied state 
lawmakers to expand the scope of a criminal statute that makes it a crime to fail to turn over possession 
of RTO property). 
 268.  Id. MultiState Associates is a firm of lobbyists that seeks passage of industry-friendly laws. See 
Services, MULTISTATE ASSOCIATES, https://www.multistate.com/content/services [https://perma.cc/ 
9P7A-VWK8] (last visited June 26, 2016). It has compiled a fifty-state survey of theft-related crimes for 
the American Rental Association. See also MULTISTATE ASSOCS., THEFT OF RENTAL SERVICES 50-
STATE SURVEY (2007), https://www.bipac.net/ararental/Theft_of_Rental_Services.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
A9W3-Z6BK]. 
 269.  See, e.g., Bert v. Commonwealth, No. 1499–10–1, 2011 WL 4916203, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 
2011) (holding that intent to defraud “cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by [the 
Commonwealth] merely showing that appellant failed to honor the terms of her lease agreement” and 
reversing appellant’s conviction for failing to return a television); State v. Sanders, 905 So. 2d 241, 242–
43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the prosecution could not prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt merely by showing that the RTO customer failed to return RTO property after the company sent 
her a certified letter demanding its return). 
 270.  Hearing on H.B. 5611 Before the Gen. Assemb. Judiciary Comm. (Conn. Mar. 14, 2006), 
transcript available at https://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/juddata/chr/2006JUD00314-R001000-CHR.htm 
[https://perma.cc/ A72L-YXR7]. 
 271.  Id. (“I offer an experience of frustration of being powerless to collect legitimate rental fees from 
customers who fail to return my rental equipment on time. Each year I lose approximately ten to fifteen 
thousand dollars in revenue due to these uncollectible late charges. And of course, as a result, the State 
of Connecticut also loses its share of that revenue through its lost sales tax.”). 
 272.  Id. 
 273.  Id. (suggesting that his company provides a “valuable service to the public by offering equipment 
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Contradicting Mr. Legasse’s characterization of the proposed bill, Raphael 
Podolsky, a legal aid attorney with the Legal Assistance Resource Center of 
Connecticut, testified that law could be used to impose criminal liability on all 
customers, not just those renting for commercial purposes.274 He asserted that the  
real purpose275 of the proposed law was to intimidate customers into paying 
through fear of arrests: 
House Bill 5611 . . . is about people who have returned [RTO] goods, but they owe something . 
. .  [T]he purpose of the bill is to make it possible to threaten them with arrest or to actually 
arrest people. You should note that it applies to all leasing of goods . . . . This includes when 
you go to the video store and rent a video, it includes a computer rental, a musical instrument 
rental, whatever it is . . . It does have the capacity to turn the police into bill collectors. The 
reality is that this is no different from any other kind of bill. We do not allow people to be 
arrested because they are behind on a bill. And there is no reason to be carving out a special 
exception for this industry.276 
Apparently, persuaded by Mr. Poldosky and other consumer advocates, the 
Connecticut General Assembly passed a version of the bill, later enacted, that 
exempts from prosecution individuals who enter into rental agreements for 
“personal, family or household purposes.”277 
Similarly, consumer advocates in Virginia have successfully stopped the 
prosecution of consumers for failing to return RTO goods.278 After arrests for 
failing to return RTO property soared in Virginia,279 consumer advocates initially 
made unsuccessful attempts to get politicians to repeal the Virginia statute that 
made it a crime for a customer to fail to return rental property within ten days of 
 
for construction, corporate meetings, weddings, parties, a limitless number of situations and items”).  
 274.  Id.  
 275.  Mr. Podolsky was not exaggerating when he stated that a person could be arrested for failing to 
pay for something as small as a video rental. For instance, in South Carolina, a state that also has a law 
criminalizing the failure to return rental property, a woman was arrested after failing to pay rental fees 
at a video rental store. Philip Bantz, ‘Monster-In-Law’ VHS Arrest a PR Nightmare For Pickens County, 
N.C. LAW. WEEKLY (Feb. 20, 2014), http://nclawyersweekly.com/2014/02/20/monster-in-law-vhs-arrest-
a-pr-nightmare-for-pickens-county/ [https://perma.cc/35BM-S5PC]. For some reason not revealed to the 
public, the sheriff decided to run Ms. Finley’s name through a criminal database and discovered an 
outstanding warrant for her arrest for failing to return a VHS videotape of “Monster-In-Law,” which she 
had rented nine years earlier. Id. He arrested Ms. Finley on the spot even though the video rental store 
had been closed for a few years. Id. Ms. Finley spent the night in jail and was released the next day on a 
$2,000 personal recognizance bond. Id. When TMZ caught wind of the story and reported it, the news 
story went viral and the sheriff’s office received enormous negative media attention. Id. The owner of 
the defunct store also heard about it and asked that the charges against Ms. Finley be dropped. Id. This 
movie could not have been worth more than $20 at the time she rented it, yet she was charged with a 
crime that carried a maximum fine $1,000 or 30 days in jail. Id. 
 276.  Hearing on H.B. 5611, supra note 270. 
 277.  See CONN. GEN. STATUTES ANN. § 53a–126b (defining “criminal trover in the second degree”).  
 278.  See infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text. 
 279.  See, e.g., Heather Sullivan, Convictions rise for merchandise renters who default, LIVE 5 NEWS 
(2011), http://www.live5news.com/story/15961694/convictions-rise-for-merchandise-renters-who-default 
[https://perma.cc/ENR8-XMPL] (stating that the number of convictions rose from thirty-three in 2008 to 
fifty-three in 2010). For example, Antonio Walker, mentioned in the introduction, lost his job after he 
was arrested for allegedly failing to return RTO property. Hansen, supra note 3. 
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the owner making a demand for its return.280 Then, in 2014, a businessman sought 
to make the law even more punitive by expanding the criminal penalties for 
failing to return RTO property. Consumer advocates, seeing this as the chance to 
push for stronger protection of RTO consumers, struck a compromise that gave 
the businessman what he wanted281 but that resulted in an amended statute that 
exempts consumers who sign RTO contracts from prosecution.282 Consumer 
advocates then started a campaign to educate prosecutors and public defenders 
about the change in the law.283 As a result, honest RTO customers who initially 
make RTO payments but later suffer a financial setback no longer need to fear 
prosecution in Virginia. 
Unfortunately, most states still have theft statutes that RTO companies can 
rely on to unlawfully terrorize consumers with threats of arrest or to unlawfully 
initiate criminal action to have them arrested.284 State lawmakers, therefore, need 
to amend theft statutes related to RTO property and exclude from prosecution 
consumers who enter into RTO contracts for personal, family, or household use. 
 
 280.  In 2013, advocates succeeded only in getting lawmakers to expand the time period to return 
RTO property from ten to thirty days. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118 (West 2013) (amended by Act of 
Mar. 3, 2014, ch. 56, 2014 Va. Acts 100).  
 281.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118(D). Subsection D is the provision that the businessman wanted 
to add to the statute, and it reads as follows: 
D. The court shall order a person found guilty of an offense under this section to make 
restitution as the court deems appropriate to the lessor. Such restitution may include (i) the cost 
of repairing such property; (ii) if the property is not returned or cannot reasonably be repaired, 
the actual value of such property; and (iii) any reasonable loss of revenue by the lessor resulting 
from the fraudulent conversion or removal of such property. 
 282.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-118(A) (2014). It now reads as follows: 
A. Whenever any person is in possession or control of any personal property, by virtue of or 
subject to a written lease of such property, except property described in § 18.2-117 or in 
the Virginia Lease-Purchase Agreement Act (§ 59.1-207.17 et seq.), and such person so in 
possession or control shall, with intent to defraud, sell, secrete, or destroy the property, or 
dispose of the property for his own use, or fraudulently remove the same from the 
Commonwealth without the written consent of the lessor thereof, or fail to return such 
property to the lessor thereof within 30 days after expiration of the lease or rental period 
for such property stated in such written lease, he shall be deemed guilty of the larceny 
thereof. 
(emphasis added in underline).  
 283.  See, e.g., Jeremy P. White Is Legal Aid Award Recipient, VA. STATE BAR (Apr. 30, 2015), http:// 
m.vsb.org/site/news/item/white_legal_aid_award_0415 [https://perma.cc/4LED-2DTF] (announcing that 
Attorney Jeremy White, who also trains other attorneys, was honored for his various legal activities, 
including working with the Virginia Legal Aid Society and lawyers with the Virginia Poverty Law Center 
to obtain “a repeal of the Virginia Code section that permitted owners of rent-to-own furniture stores to 
criminally charge customers who fell behind on their payments”); Rent-To-Own Stores Can No Longer 
Use Prosecutors as their Debt Collectors, VA. POVERTY L. CTR. (July 9, 2014), http://www.vplc.org/rent-
to-own-stores-can-no-longer-use-prosecutors-as-their-debt-collectors [https://perma.cc/NY8B-4ZBS] 
(educating the public that RTO customers can no longer be prosecuted for failing to return RTO 
property). 
 284. See also supra notes 70–81 and accompanying text (describing how a RTO customer in Oregon 
was unlawfully arrested and charged with a crime after the RTO company’s employees falsely 
represented that she refused to make any payments). See also THEFT OF RENTAL SERVICES 50-STATE 
SURVEY, supra note 268. 
JOHNSON_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/10/2017  11:23 PM 
No. 3 2017]     PROSECUTING CREDITORS AND PROTECTING CONSUMERS 259 
 
Moreover, consumer protection laws need to be amended to severely penalize 
RTO companies that resort to criminalization tactics.285 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Whether lenders engage in criminalization tactics that actually initiate 
criminal prosecution or merely threaten to do so, they have every incentive to 
continue such practices, especially when they are successful in getting consumers 
to relinquish ownership of assets or to pay phantom debts or amounts far in 
excess of what they owe. Similar to consumers subjected to criminal prosecution, 
consumers who are victimized by a creditor’s misuse of civil contempt are in a 
legally precarious situation. Like Ms. Shaw, they are sitting in 
jail without the ability to get a court-appointed attorney and must post the full 
amount of the required bail to be released from jail.286 
Lawmakers will do a great service to vulnerable consumers by implementing 
the above-proposed solutions to deter payday lenders, car title lenders, debt 
collection companies, and any other creditors from employing criminalization 
tactics against consumers. Although the proposal did not cover every type of 
high-cost lender that resorts to criminalization tactics, state lawmakers could 
adopt some of the proposed solutions by imposing stiff financial penalties on such 
lenders287 and decriminalizing theft-related statutes,288 thereby preventing state 
laws from being used to arrest or prosecute consumers. 
Until state legislatures decide to act, it is imperative that state and local law 
enforcement pursue prosecution of creditors for extortion. Rather than blaming 
consumers for their predicaments,289 prosecutors should focus on the culpability 
 
 285. The same proposed liability recommended for deterring payday lenders should also be 
implemented against RTO companies that engage in criminalization practices. See supra notes 267–269 
and accompanying text (proposing that lawmakers require courts to impose treble and punitive damages 
against payday lenders and make their arbitration and class-action wavier clauses unenforceable). 
 286.  See, e.g., supra notes 114–33 (describing how a payday lender’s use of civil contempt led to the 
arrest of Ms. Shaw, who stayed in jail until her mother could find someone to borrow money from in 
order to pay the full bail amount to obtain Ms. Shaw’s release from jail). 
 287. See, e.g., supra note 264 and accompanying text (proposing that if a payday lender is found liable 
for threatening or initiating criminal prosecution against a consumer, the lender should be liable for 
treble and punitive damages, along with attorneys’ fees). 
 288. See, e.g., supra notes 276–282 and accompanying text (explaining how consumer advocates in 
Connecticut and Virginia were able to get legislation passed exempting RTO customers from criminal 
prosecution if the RTO property is obtained for personal, family or household use). 
 289.  The United States has a culture of blaming victims in numerous contexts. See generally Jon 
Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in America, 41 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 413 (2006). The rape victim was “asking for it” because she was wearing provocative 
clothing. See, e.g., Alinor C. Sterling, Undressing the Victim: The Intersection of Evidentiary and Semiotic 
Meanings of Women’s Clothing in Rape Trials, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 87 (1995). See also Susan D. 
Rozelle, Fear and Loathing in Insanity Law: Explaining the Otherwise Inexplicable Clark v. Arizona, 58 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 19, 28 (2007) (Victim blaming is not intended to be cruel but is a way of protecting 
oneself from feeling vulnerable: “Rather than feeling vulnerable, we prefer to imagine that the victim is 
to blame.”).  
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of the alleged extortionists and prosecute when evidence reveals guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.290 Such prosecutions vindicate consumers and simultaneously  
send the message that extortion is not a lawful way to collect debts from 
consumers even if they are validly owed.291 
Poor, nameless consumers deserve to be protected from extortion just as 
much as rich, famous victims like David Letterman. He could meet with 
prosecutors in New York and know that he would not hear: “you got what you 
deserve for cheating on your wife.”292 Robert Halderman was investigated for 
and charged with attempted larceny by extortion because he demanded $2 
million from Letterman in exchange for not revealing Letterman’s past sexual 
relationships with female staffers.293 Letterman could have easily paid the money 
demanded, but he chose not. Moreover, he had the financial resources to hire the 
best lawyers to advise him on the best course of action. 
Unlike David Letterman, vulnerable consumers and their families usually 
cannot afford an attorney, and they are coerced into complying with creditors’ 
demands, thereby suffering great financial harm.294 When a consumer victimized 
by criminalization practices makes a payment, it does not prove the legitimacy of 
the debt owed or that the consumer had the means to pay all along.295 To the 
contrary, payment only proves that the creditor perceived the consumer’s 
vulnerability and exploited it by threatening criminal prosecution or exposure of 
the consumer’s indebtedness. The consumer’s vulnerability, coupled with a 
desperation to avoid going to or to get out of jail, means the consumer will comply 
with the creditors demand by relinquishing possession of their assets and paying 
off the debt, sometimes using exempted funds or money borrowed from others. 
Instead of blaming the victims, we should collectively agree with the district 
attorney’s public pronouncement promoting equal treatment: “New York City 
will not tolerate the coercion or extortion of anyone, be the victim rich or poor, 
famous or anonymous. The law prohibits conduct like defendant’s and attaches 
severe penalties to it. We intend to enforce the law.”296 It is time to enforce the 
 
 290.  See, e.g., supra notes 20–34 (describing a compelling example of extortion based on an explicit 
threat where a repo man handed a consumer a written document stating that she would be arrested and 
quoting an entire section of the criminal code she purportedly violated by not relinquishing possession 
of her car to the repo man). 
 291.  People v. Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392 (N.Y. App. Div. 1952). 
 292.  See Alicia Maxey Greene, News Release, N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATT’Y’S OFF. (Oct. 2. 2009), https:// 
web.archive.org/web/20091005175911/http://manhattanda.org/whatsnew/press/2009-10-2.shtml [https:// 
perma.cc/37NF-DZLB].  
 293.  Id. 
 294.  See, e.g., supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text (stating that a payday loan borrower, 
Wakita Shaw, had to borrow money to get her out of jail, and then, a few months later, Ms. Shaw herself 
filed bankruptcy).  
 295.  See, e.g., supra notes 152–156 and accompanying text; Johnson, supra note 7 (describing several 
examples of consumers who paid phantom payday loan debts because the debt collection companies used 
the consumers’ sensitive information (for example, social security numbers) to convince them that they 
owed the debts and that they would be immediately arrested if they failed to pay).  
 296.  Id. (statement by Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau). 
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law against creditors that use criminalization tactics to terrorize consumers into 
paying civil debts or relinquishing their assets. 
 
